THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE DUTCH EXTREME RIGHT: DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES AND SUPPORT FOR THE CENTER DEMOCRATS IN THE 1990s*

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This article seeks to explain why the Dutch extreme-right party, Center Democrats (CD), never succeeded in breaking out of its marginal position. It argues that, in addition to analyzing fluctuations in electoral support, scholars should also examine the degree to which extreme-right parties are able to express their views in the mass media. Supply-side explanations are extended by showing that discursive political opportunities need to be openly acknowledged and debated publicly to become relevant. Relying on longitudinal data derived from political claims analysis and opinion polls, this article demonstrates that negative public reactions significantly eroded the electoral attractiveness of the extreme-right party. In contrast, when one’s goal is to achieve mass media access, the results reveal that any publicity is favorable publicity. Public criticism enhanced the CD’s access to the public debate. Also, rising support in opinion polls led to more public claim making. Remarkably, however, the extreme right party did not increase its electoral support when it made itself more prominently heard in the mass media. Thus, the CD appeared trapped in a spiral of discursive weakness.

One of the key questions for scholars of contemporary politics is the emergence and rise of extreme right-wing parties. Despite the definitional debate in the literature, a consensus has emerged that these parties should be grouped into one single party family (Arzheimer 2009). The most important common denominator of these parties is their anti-immigrant stance and ethnocultural notion of citizenship, reflected in the idea of “own people first” (e.g., Betz 1994; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Moreover, these parties also have a common anti-establishment rhetoric (e.g., Carter 2005).

The most appealing and successful extreme-right parties get ample attention, but it might easily be forgotten that the vast majority fail to break through or remain marginal and short lived. For a full understanding of why political mobilization against migrants is sometimes successful, we should also focus on the broad range of attempts that never succeed. The Netherlands is a very interesting case in point, because a significant electoral performance of the far right never took place until relatively recently—despite a sufficient electoral reservoir and favorable opportunity structure, which had been in place for some time. Right-wing parties List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and, following its footsteps, Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) achieved considerable levels of support. Moreover, they attracted widespread media publicity. The ability of these two parties to express their views in the public debate and to gain substantial electoral support constitutes a remarkable contrast with the situation in the 1980s and 1990s. The right-wing Centrumdemocraten (Center Democrats, hereafter: CD), headed by Hans Janmaat, experienced some ups and downs but never succeeded in obtaining a strong

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2009 annual meeting of the Dutch and Flemish Political Science Associations (Politicologenetmaal). I am grateful to the participants of this meeting, to Ruud Koopmans, Boris Slijper, Fleur Thomése, and to the reviewers of Mobilization for their valuable feedback and helpful comments.
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voice in the mass media, nor in mobilizing and consolidating significant electoral support. The central aim of this article is to explain why the CD remained a “marginal phenomenon” (Lucardie 2000) and failed to break out of this position.

At the start of the 1990s, the CD had experienced a long period of “stable marginality” (Scheepers, Eisinga, and Lammers 1994: 93). After 1991, this started to change. The unofficial and silent agreement between the mainstream political parties of “hushing-up” the CD was questioned by political commentators. Beginning in March 1993, the party experienced an electoral wave. Subsequently, media access increased considerably, but a wave of negative reactions appeared as well. The expectations for the May national elections in 1994 were high, but negative publicity, it is argued, toned down the actual outcome (Mudde and Van Holsteyn 1994; Van Donselaar 1997). The second half of the decade was characterized by the party’s further marginalization and eventual demise. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the CD lost the three seats it had achieved in 1994. There has hardly been any activity of the party after these elections, and in June 1999 the CD ceased to exist.

Although the CD has principally sought to exert influence through institutionalized politics, there are good reasons to connect two areas of scholarship—social movements and electoral studies—and build more bridges between the two literatures (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). First, explanations for the fortunes of radical-right parties are very similar to those of social movements. They both often rely on the economic market metaphor of demand and supply and use the notion of a “political opportunity structure”—i.e., the openness of the political system to challengers (e.g., Arzheimer 2009). Second, by neglecting the electoral channel, social movement research tends to overlook the most important contemporary collective actors mobilizing against the consequences of globalization: the populist radical right (Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Social movement protests have generally been dominated by “the left,” while the populist radical right mainly relies on the electoral channel when it seeks to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments among the “losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2008). We are only able to fully grasp the implications of globalization processes and large-scale immigration for political contention when we also open our perspective to the electoral channel.

This study aims to improve our understanding of the performances of right-wing parties in three respects. First, and most importantly, I argue that we should not only explain why certain extreme-right parties attract more voters than others, but also why these groups are, at certain moments, far more successful in having a voice in the public debate in the first place (Koopmans and Muis 2009). Thus, success includes two elements: electoral support and public claim making. This second criterion for success refers to the degree to which a group is able to articulate its political views in the public discourse.

Second, using a discursive opportunity approach, I differentiate between positive and negative coverage and between extreme-right speakers and responses of other actors. Several previous studies that investigate the role of the media (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers 2001; Walgrave and De Swert 2002) examine the amount of coverage on the issues related to extreme-right parties (most predominantly, the issue of immigration) or the amount of coverage devoted to the party in question. Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and Van Spanje (2012) make a step forward in this regard by distinguishing between the visibility of leaders and parties. They rightly suggest that the tone of the coverage should also be considered. Indeed, a group’s media standing is not equivalent to the coverage it receives in the news: an actor may appear in the media discourse when it is criticized, while having little opportunity to express its own views (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht 2002).

Third, acknowledging that media debates are relatively volatile, I focus on short-term dynamics. Much previous research has examined the influence of both individual characteristics (such as one’s socioeconomic status) and contextual factors (such as the country’s unemployment rate) on anti-immigration party support (e.g., Van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000). While these studies tend to focus on variation across space, few scholars have examined variation in extreme-right support across time (Kitschelt 2007).
EXTREME-RIGHT SUCCESS AND FAILURE: WHY PUBLIC DEBATE MATTERS

There are two major sets of explanations for the emergence and rise of extreme-right political behavior, one focusing on grievances and one on political opportunities. This corresponds with the metaphor from economics distinguishing “demand-side” and “supply-side” factors (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005; Rydgren 2007). In the social movement literature, the opportunity perspective has gained predominance over grievance theories, while academic work that focuses on electoral politics often treats extreme-right parties as products of demand-side processes (Giugni, Koopmans, Passy, and Statham 2005: 160), in particular worsening economic conditions and increasing ethnic competition (e.g., Betz 1994; Ignazi 2003).

The grievances perspective cannot fully account for rapid mobilization and demobilization of support and mass media standing (Norris 2005). Therefore, a complete and satisfying explanation needs to go beyond the demand-side model. According to supply-side theories, successes and failures are mainly shaped by networks, resources of organizations, and political opportunities. These factors should be viewed as complementary to, rather than competing with, demand-side explanations (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007). The supply side can be distinguished by internal factors, like organizational characteristics (De Witte and Klandermans 2000; Mudde 2007), and by external factors such as the institutional framework and elite responses (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1995). Only the volatile and dynamic supply-side factors seem relevant here, as the research question concerns short-term developments within one country. Thus, I will not review the role of relatively stable or persistent political opportunities and constraints, which tend to characterize electoral systems.

Although the concept of political opportunities has been widely used to explain movement success, it should be complemented with the notion that opportunities and constraints, such as divisions within elite groups and elite support, need to become visible through public statements in order to become relevant (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). The public sphere is a restricted communicative space in which a variety of organizations, groups, and individuals compete for the scarce resource of attention (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). It has more and more become the principal ground for power struggles: political contention increasingly consists of a battle over attention and approval in the public debate, like a performance on a stage with the electorate as the audience (Manin 1997). As Castells (1997: 312) puts it: “Outside the media sphere there is only political marginality.” For example, Le Pen’s party made its first major electoral breakthrough in France only after it was given access to state television (Eatwell 2005), and the rapid rise of Haider’s FPÖ was partly the result of favorable coverage from the Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s largest newspaper (Art 2007). For the specification of the political opportunity structure to explain the rise and demise in extreme-right public standing and electoral support, I will follow the outline of Koopmans and colleagues (2005), who distinguish two dimensions: discursive opportunities and political space.

“Political space” refers to the degree to which mainstream parties already occupy the electoral terrain of the radical right. Their stances affect the openness of the political system to new anti-immigration parties. Here, we need to distinguish issue positions from issue salience (e.g., Meguid 2008). Concerning the latter, there are good reasons to expect that an increase in the salience of immigration and integration issues positively affects the support and media access of anti-immigration parties. The agenda-setting hypothesis holds that issues that appear frequently in the news tend to become the issues that voters deem important (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Combined with the idea that the electorate is likely to support the most credible proponent of a particular issue (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), it follows that media publicity for issues that are “owned” by anti-immigration parties enhances their electoral attractiveness.
However, as for instance Meguid (2008) has argued, an increase in issue salience will only lead to an increase in radical-right support when mainstream parties declare hostility toward the niche party’s policy position, but not when they employ accommodative tactics. Simply put, mainstream parties have three strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the particular issue (dismissive), distance itself from anti-immigrant viewpoints (adversarial), or adopt a position similar to the niche party’s (accommodative). Meguid (2008) points out that if mainstream parties address immigration topics and adopt anti-immigration stances, electoral support for far right contenders will diminish. Most scholars similarly argue that when mainstream parties adopt restrictive positions on immigration, the extreme right loses out (e.g., Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1995). According to Ignazi (2003: 211), the tough position of the Dutch mainstream right party (the conservative liberal VVD) on the immigration issue partly explains why the CD lost all seats in the 1998 elections (see also Van der Brug et al. 2000). Likewise, my expectation is that restrictive political claim making on the immigration and integration issue by other political actors is likely to decrease both extreme-right popularity (hypothesis 1A) and presence in the public sphere (hypothesis 1B).

The notion of “discursive opportunities” means that media discourse not only reflects the actual political contention, but it also amplifies and distorts it by ascribing credibility, relevance, and legitimacy to certain actors, issues, and points of view, but not to others (Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans 2004). More specifically, discursive opportunities for extreme-right actors consist of three elements: visibility, resonance, and the nature of reactions in the public debate (Koopmans 2004). Visibility is defined by the prominence that media gatekeepers allocate to a message. Resonance depends upon the degree to which an actor or a message provokes reactions. Both positive and negative reactions tend to improve discursive opportunities by creating either dissonance or consonance.

I have identified two outcomes that define success for right-wing parties: electoral attractiveness and public claim making. With regard to the first dependent variable, electoral attractiveness, Lubbers and Scheepers (2001) argue that putting a populist right party into a “bad light” is an ineffective way to decrease its popularity, as potential supporters will filter the news in favor of their opinion because of selective perception. They conclude that neglecting the extreme-right wing is a more effective way to neutralize these parties than writing unfavorably about them, since higher levels of attention for the German extreme right actually increased electoral support. However, in the Dutch case, Lubbers (2001) found that media attention for extreme-right parties did not affect voting intentions, in striking contrast with the conventional wisdom that the collapse of the Dutch extreme right was partly due to a “torrent of negative publicity” (Van Donselaar 1997: 6) and “demonization by the media” (Ignazi 2003: 167). Lubbers’ remarkable finding might be due to the fact that the variable “media attention” is a single measurement of overall coverage devoted to the parties in question. Distinguishing claim making and visibility from resonance may be the solution to this paradox: counting the number of articles taps media access for a party, but it also includes the amount of critical reactions. I expect that having the opportunity to communicate to citizens by placing one’s topics on the agenda is beneficial. A challenging movement or party will use its voice in the media to get its message across—for instance, claims of the CD are expected to inform and persuade potential supporters. Thus, I hypothesize that electoral support is enhanced by claim making and media visibility of the CD (hypothesis 2A). Receiving coverage or mention in the news is not the same as being heard or being directly quoted (Ferree et al. 2002). Extreme right groups may not be treated as actors with a relevant or legitimate voice, and may appear in the media discourse only when they are mentioned or criticized by others. I expect that delegitimization in the public sphere is detrimental for the mobilization of voters, and that consonant reactions in the media have a positive effect on public opinion. Put differently, I predict that electoral support is enhanced by positive reactions (hypothesis 3A) and is decreased by negative reactions (hypothesis 4A).
The mechanisms that underlie the temporal ups and downs in electoral support do not necessarily explain fluctuations in the frequency of public claim making. With regard to this second dependent variable, the behavior of journalists plays a pivotal role. Being “silent” or fastidious about whether to join a particular debate can be a deliberate tactical choice for some organizations (Rohlinger 2006), but this is not an option for challenging groups that have limited media access. Movements are generally much more dependent on media than the reverse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). The decisions of journalists to give groups media access are shaped by so-called “news values” that indicate if a message is newsworthy (Galtung and Ruge 1965). News deals mostly with those who hold power, while challengers have more difficulty gaining access and attention (Gans 2004 [1979]; Gitlin 1980). Publicity is positively related to the amount of status or “political standing” enjoyed by a particular actor (Wolfsfeld and Sheafer 2006). Established parties and state actors almost automatically gain ample opportunity to make public claims. Journalists routinely turn to these actors because those in charge are expected to respond when something important happens. Moreover, those with political standing have at their disposal more of the resources, staff, and skills that tend to increase access to media. Thus, I predict that higher levels of electoral support increase newsworthiness and opportunities to acquire media access (Jenkins 1999).

My hypothesis is that electoral support increases the frequency of public claim making of the CD (hypothesis 5).

Gatekeepers can enhance or diminish the power of those to whom they offer or deny standing, because access to the news media can, by itself, become an indicator of power (Ferree et al. 2002). The media spotlight validates a challenger as an important player (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). In Gamson’s (2004: 251) words: “Being visible and quoted defines for other journalists and a broader public who really matters.” Thus, I expect continuity: once an actor or message has become headline news, it remains in the media spotlight for some time. So claim making and visibility will enhance the potential for an actor to diffuse subsequent messages in the public sphere. My hypothesis is higher levels of visibility and public claim making in the previous period will increase access to the public debate in the following period (hypothesis 2B).

As I argued above, negative coverage could be harmful for maintaining electoral support. In contrast, trying to attract as much attention as possible under the motto “any publicity is good publicity” might be a rather successful strategy for gaining a more influential voice in the media platform. In line with Koopmans and Olzak (2004), I assume that public reactions (whether negative or positive) increase the speaker’s chances to gain more space for subsequent messages, as it makes the actor more relevant in the eyes of journalists. It is likely that newsworthiness is actually increased by negative attacks, since negative news enters the news cycle more easily (Galtung and Ruge 1965). This leads me to expect that both positive (hypothesis 3B) and negative (hypothesis 4B) reactions increase the frequency of Janmaat’s public claim making.

Koopmans and Olzak (2004) include all negative responses in their measurement of dissonance, so it covers a wide range of public rejections and condemnations directed against the extreme right, including state repression. In contrast, I distinguish between repression and dissonance, since the impact of repressive actions, like prosecuting movement leaders for hate speech, differs from the effect of media coverage (Van Spanj and De Vreese 2015). Repression refers to the formal decisions of political elites in dealing with challengers, which can be either repressive or facilitative (Kriesi et al. 1995). Although state repression may not always have a purely negative effect on mobilization—since it might generate moral shocks, solidarity, and motivation among protesters (Almeida 2003)—Koopmans (1997) concludes that institutional repression (such as trials and bans of demonstrations) had a clear negative impact on the amount of movement activity of the German extreme right in the 1990s. On paper, the Netherlands is not a “militant democracy” like Germany as there are no explicit repressive actions to defend “the principles of the free democratic order” (Mudde 2004: 197).
Nevertheless, the intensification in legal sanctions against racist statements during the 1990s might offer an explanation for the collapse of the Dutch extreme right (Van Donselaar 1997). What has been unique in the legal approach in the Netherlands is the systematic prohibition of public meetings of extreme-right parties and organizations on the ground that these meetings endanger “the public order” (Fennema 2000). When the extreme right would ask for permission to demonstrate in a city, antifascists would announce a countermobilization and the mayor would ban the demonstration for fear of public disturbances (Mudde 2004). In conclusion, concerning the party’s electoral popularity, I predict that, like other dissonant claims, repression has a negative impact (hypothesis 6A). Furthermore, whereas I have hypothesized that dissonant claims are beneficial for making one’s voice heard in the media debate, I expect that repression is harmful for gaining access to the public discourse (hypothesis 6B).

Finally, dissonant public reactions come not only from outsiders but also, occasionally, from party members. Therefore, the degree of organizational fragmentation will be taken into account. I expect that media statements about internal strife harm the party. A political party or movement encounters severe problems if it cannot mobilize a sufficient number of loyal members or activists (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977). Lack of a well-organized party structure, shortfall of membership, and organizational disunity have been proposed as pivotal factors that explain why the CD remained in a “circle of organizational weakness” and eventually collapsed (De Witte and Klandermans 2000). To conclude, my expectation is that organizational fragmentation decreases both electoral popularity (hypothesis 7A) and presence in the public sphere (hypothesis 7B).

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

Data and Dependent Variables

The period under investigation starts in January 1992 and runs until May 1998. Thus, the analysis contains both a period of (moderate) success and the inglorious demise of the CD. This temporal frame is cut into two-week units of observations, but I will also conduct additional analyses based on weekly units. By aggregating over biweekly and weekly units I am able to capture relatively short-term media dynamics. The reason for starting in 1992 is a pragmatic one, namely, the ability to make use of an extensive existing dataset for this period, which consists of hand-coded political claims analysis data gathered by Koopmans and colleagues (2005; see also Koopmans and Statham 1999). A political claim is a “strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticism, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 24). In total, 627 coded political claims were derived from articles in the *NRC Handelsblad*, one of the most prominent daily newspapers in the Netherlands.

Relying on Hayes and Krippendorff (2007), an intercoder reliability check of the coding of political claims in the Dutch context with three coders revealed that Krippendorff’s alpha is, respectively, 0.79 (claim identification) and 0.62 (article selection). Furthermore, the amount of agreement about the values of the claim-based variables varied from perfect to acceptable; Krippendorff’s alpha ranged from 1.00 (claim making by the radical right party; resonance) to 0.60 (visibility), with negative immigration claims (0.70) and dissonance (0.87) in between. Following the guidelines of Krippendorff (2012), some aspects in the coding procedure are only slightly below the recommended minimum level of inter-rater reliability (alpha > 0.667), so I considered these scores as adequate since the alpha is a strict measure (cf. Hanna 2013).

Comparisons between newspapers reveal that, although there are differences in the rates of coverage of claims, there is a striking similarity in the distribution of important characteristics of claims (Koopmans et al. 2005: 261). This confirms other research that concluded
that, in contrast with the absolute amount of coverage, there are hardly any differences in the
tone and portrayal of radical-right politicians (Schaan, Wester, and Scheepers 2009; Bos,
Van der Brug, and De Vree 2010). Counting the number of articles between 1986-2004,
Schaan (2009) found that, in absolute terms, two highly regarded Dutch newspapers de-
ved more attention to the radical right than the popular Telegraaf—not surprisingly, as the
latter has simply less news content in general. Relatively speaking, however, he did not ob-
serve differences in the visibility and prominence of the radical right; neither did he find
empirical support for differences in what he labeled “support attention” and “substantial atten-
tion.” This is in contrast to the expectation of Mazzoleni (2003) that there are significant dif-
fences between tabloid and elite media.

The amount of public claim making by the Center Democrats is the count of political claims
made by the CD, irrespective of the subject. Public opinion support for the Center Democrats
is the percentage of people that reported the intention to vote for the CD if parliamentary
elections would be held the next day, using survey data gathered by NIPO (NIPO/Steinmetz-
Archief 1999).

Explanatory Variables

The variable negative immigration claims measures the number of restrictive claims re-
lated to immigration and integration by all other political actors.6

Visibility measures the extent to which claims were reported prominently. It is calculated
as the sum of scores on four elements: the article in which the claim is reported appears on the
front page, the claim is referred to in the headline of the article, the claim is mentioned as the
first one in the article, and the claim is repeated in follow-up articles (within two weeks). The
total amount of prominence during one time period is divided by the total number of claims
made by the CD.

Consonance (supportive reactions) and dissonance (critical reactions) capture all political
reactions to the CD—i.e., all public claims by other actors that are directed to or referring to
the party, except repression (see below). Resonance also includes indirect reactions, for in-
estance, when someone urges a mayor to not allow a demonstration organized by the extreme-
right party. “Soft” repression and nonstate repression (Linden and Klandermans 2006) are
also included in this variable. Examples of such “unofficial” repression that appeared in the
articles include: “The workers union expels a member because of his CD membership”, “An
owner of a hotel refuses to rent congress facilities for a CD party meeting,” and “The manager
of a taxi company suspends an employee from duty because he has distributed CD leaflets to
customers.”

Claim making by the CD and the count of critical reactions during a period are strongly
 correlated (Pearson’s \( r \) is 0.78). We have to conclude that there is a close relationship between
the frequency of Janmaat’s public statements and the negative reactions of others. Including
the lagged variables simultaneously in a multivariate regression leads to multicollinearity
problems. Therefore, the biweekly count of CD claim making is subtracted from the number
of times Janmaat and his party are criticized. Dissonance is thus the surplus number of
negative reactions (Pearson’s \( r \) is now 0.44). Dissonance is coded zero when there were no
critical statements referring to Janmaat or his party during a given time period. The variable
consonance (hypotheses 3A and 3B) will be left out of the analysis, because only 17 suppor-
tive claims were reported during the whole period of study—that is, there is very little vari-
ation over time. The observed lack of consonance is in line with findings of Schaan et al.
(2009): a relatively small proportion of all news reports during the election periods in 1994
and 1998 contain exclusively positive attitudes towards the far right (three and seven percent
respectively). In my case, about four percent of all claims referring to the CD are supportive
reactions.
My measure of repression by state agencies against the CD includes both institutional and situational forms of repression. Institutional repression consists of general decisions taken by political authorities (such as a ban of a demonstration by a mayor) or the judiciary (such as trials and convictions). Situational repression refers to unplanned, ad hoc actions of the police, such as arrests of CD members during a demonstration. Verbal pleas for legal action against the CD are coded as dissonance, not as repression, as they are not themselves actions or decisions. Repression should also be political in nature. This implies that when a member of the CD is arrested or convicted for insurance fraud or drug trafficking, this event is not coded as repression.

Organizational fragmentation consists of the number of “defections” of party members. It includes statements made by CD members who announce their resignation or their refusal to take their seats in the local councils, as well as decisions by the party to abandon a member. These claims are excluded from the dependent variable by the CD. Note that expressions of loyalty or support for the party made by CD members are included in the count of CD claims. Statements of former CD members are included in resonance.

Although I focus on short-term fluctuations, I will take unemployment, immigration, and the influx of asylum seekers into account as control variables, as they have often proved to be empirically relevant for explaining extreme-right party popularity (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003; Scheepers, Gijbrechts, and Coenders 2002) and perhaps also influence access to the public discourse. These data were retrieved from Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2007, 2008). Because these are monthly rates, an extrapolation procedure was employed to create biweekly rates. However, these factors are clearly a better fit for theoretical frameworks that seek to explain long-term developments and for research designs that use longer units of analysis, such as months or quarters.

Appendix A lists descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. The time sequence is a critical element: the cause (explanatory variable) has to precede the consequence (dependent variable) and, therefore, in both analyses the explanatory variables are lagged. Effects are assumed to occur at lag 1, but alternative lags at 2 and 3 units will also be tested.

**Procedure**

The variable claim making is an event count with discrete and non-negative values. King (1989) explains why ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is inappropriate for this outcome. Count variables are likely to display positive contagion: one count increases the likelihood of observing additional events in the same period. Observing both a large number of lower counts and very high counts (overdispersion) implies that we have more variability than is acceptable for an independent Poisson process and, therefore, a negative binomial regression will be used (Long and Freese 2006). The control variables unemployment rate, immigration, and influx of asylum seekers are change scores, because my expectation is that changes in socioeconomic conditions, rather than their absolute levels, affect claim making. The public opinion poll is log-transformed. Dickey-Fuller tests show that none of the variables contains a unit root after these transformations (see appendix B).

To estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on public opinion support, I use ARIMA, also known as Box-Jenkins transfer modeling (e.g., McCleary and Hay 1980). For adequate Box-Jenkins modeling, the time series must be stationary, which means that the series has a constant mean and variance over time. Visual inspection of the opinion poll series (see figure 1) suggests that neither the mean nor the variance is stationary. Accordingly, the series is log-transformed and transformed into change scores. The explanatory variables are likewise inspected, and are logged and differenced when there is evidence of nonstationarity. For the ARIMA specifications of the variables, see appendix B. The residuals are “white noise,” which means that there is no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.
RESULTS

Before presenting results of the multivariate regression models, I begin with a brief description of the two dependent variables: public opinion ratings and the CD’s rate of public claim making. Figure 1 shows that the CD experienced a wave of electoral support in the first half of the 1990s. While the party scored about one percent at the beginning of the time series (January 1992), support in the polls had risen to five percent of the vote by the end of 1993. The electoral breakthrough of the right-wing extremist party did not last long. In the national elections in May 1994, the party gained far less than expected: 2.5 percent of the vote.

Figure 1 also shows that there was a wave of claim making in a relatively short time period (from January 1994 until May 1994). For the entire period, 121 claims are coded, most of which are made by party leader Janmaat. The surge started in January 1994 when Janmaat stated that he did not regret the death of Labor Party minister Dales. About one week later, he proclaimed (in an interview with Elsevier) that immigrants should not be allowed to hold public positions and that Minister Ballin should resign because of his Jewish ancestry. Not surprisingly, these statements provoked fierce criticism. That Janmaat gained more media access because he became more “newsworthy” can be illustrated with the fact that his further actions after these two statements are reported in unusual detail. Media report that Janmaat claimed that he was incorrectly quoted by Elsevier and that he sent a letter to Ballin to explain this mistake. The largest peak of claim making occurred around the municipal elections on March 2. A headline in NRC Handelsblad summarized a debate between the local party leaders in The Hague as follows: “Janmaat does most of the talking during political debate.” There were a considerable number of reactions during this period, ranging from the advice to not vote for the CD to pleas for a political boycott. In Eindhoven, activists threw a pie in the face of the local CD leader, and in Rotterdam the local Labor Party leader stated that it is “disgraceful that ten percent of the electorate votes for racists.” Negative publicity also peaked shortly before the Parliamentary Elections in May 1994 when a local CD member admitted (on hidden camera) that he had set fire to centers that provided services for foreigners.8

Figure 1. Public Claim Making and Public Opinion Support for CD (Jan 1992 to May 1998)

Note: The thick line represents public claim making and the thin line shows public opinion support. The source for public opinion data is NIPO/Steinmetz-archief (1999).
Determinants of Public Claim Making

Table 1 shows the results of a negative binomial regression with the number of claims as the dependent variable. The table reports the incidence rate ratio (IRR), which is the factor change in the expected count for a unit increase in the independent variable. The results reveal a strong effect of the lagged dependent variable, which indicates that the number of public claims is strongly affected by Janmaat’s presence in the public sphere one time lag earlier. Model 1 shows that one political statement or action of the extreme-right party in the public sphere increases the expected number of public claims in the following time period by a factor of 1.14, holding all other variables constant. The prominence given to previous claims has no additional impact. Thus, my hypothesis that both claim making and visibility will enhance the potential for actors to diffuse subsequent messages in the public sphere (hypothesis 2B) is only partially supported.

Furthermore, the results refute hypothesis 1B: public claims advocating anti-immigration and anti-refugee policies do not seem to have fostered Janmaat’s access to the mass media arena. I have also checked to see if the total amount of claims on the immigration and integration issue (regardless of the tone) had an impact, but this variable does not yield significant results in any of my models. I will come back to this finding when I discuss the analysis of fluctuations in public opinion support.

Table 1. Determinants of Public Claim Making of the Extreme-Right CD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative binomial regression</th>
<th>Model 1 (biweekly)</th>
<th>Model 2 (biweekly)</th>
<th>Model 3 (weekly)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>IRR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claims CD (t-1)</td>
<td>1.140**</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>1.166***</td>
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<td>Visibility (t-1)</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.989</td>
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<td>Organizational fragmentation (t-1)</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance (t-1)</td>
<td>1.181*</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>1.173*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (t-1)</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative immigration claims (t-1)</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion support (t-1)</td>
<td>1.595**</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>1.564**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment (t-1)</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>1.845</td>
<td>0.999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)</td>
<td>26.2***</td>
<td>43.46***</td>
<td>90.97***</td>
</tr>
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<td>α (dispersion parameter)</td>
<td>1.333***</td>
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<td>1.131***</td>
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<td>Wald χ²</td>
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<tr>
<td>log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-180.39</td>
<td>-177.01</td>
<td>-227.16</td>
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</table>

Notes: IRR = incidence rate ratio; SE = robust standard error; e-2 = multiply times 10^-2 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

Next, I hypothesized that dissonance has a positive impact on claim making (hypothesis 4B), based on the logic that, in terms of gaining more media access, “any publicity is favorable publicity.” The findings show that this indeed is the case. Hence, despite critics’ intentions, public criticism appears to be counterproductive since it does not diminish the media stage for populist leaders and their anti-immigration rhetoric. Interestingly, my expectation that repression has a negative impact on media access (hypothesis 6B) is not confirmed: it does not have a significant impact. Furthermore, although not significant, organizational fragmentation yields an effect in the expected (negative) direction on the
amount of public claim making of the CD in the next time period (hypothesis 7A). Also, when long-term impacts are included (assuming that internal strife and repression permanently affects all following time periods), neither organizational fragmentation nor repression have a significant effect.

Finally, the results show that public opinion (t-1) has a significant positive impact. These findings support the hypothesis that the more electoral support Janmaat received, the more he was able to express his viewpoints in the mass media (hypothesis 5). The general conclusion is that support from the general public (as indicated by opinion polls) and newsworthiness (as indicated by claim making or public reactions of others) fosters the party’s opportunity to further diffuse its standpoints in the public sphere.

The addition of the two control variables, unemployment rates and the influx of asylum seekers (model 2), does not change the conclusions just drawn. They do not affect the number of claims by the CD in the subsequent time period. Another additional test with weekly (instead of biweekly) units of observation (model 3) reveals that the same mass media dynamics also clearly operate on a shorter time scale. The only remarkable difference is that resignations or expulsions of CD members have a negative, ephemeral effect on claim making. This could be due to the fact that closely clustered peaks of internal strife claims of the CD party simply took the place of “normal” media statements. Note that the effect of organizational fragmentation on the other media variables, such as the number of dissonant claims, is not the focus of this study and could perhaps be positive.

**Determinants of Public Opinion Support**

The second question is how to explain changes in public opinion support for the CD. The results presented in table 2 show that hypothesis 2A does not find any support: remarkably, electoral attractiveness was not significantly influenced by the frequency or visibility of public claims. Concerning the effect of dissonance, the findings support my expectation that critical reactions erode popular support for the CD (hypothesis 4A). All other things being equal, the coefficient (-0.06) indicates that one act of rejection produced an average decrease in support of about five per cent. Expressed in absolute terms, this yields a decrease from 1.40 percent of the vote share (the average amount of support over this period) to 1.33 percent. As mentioned earlier, CD claims and negative reactions are closely intertwined. Given that the average number of critical reactions is higher (mean = 1.28) than the average number of claims (mean = 0.73), this suggests that, overall, claim making was counter-productive because it was frequently preceded or followed by a larger amount of criticism.

As for hypotheses 6A and 7A, the results show that neither repression nor organizational fragmentation caused a decline in support. Although the claims of CD members who abandoned the party or were expelled exert a negative impact in the expected direction, the effect is insignificant. Alternative models (not shown) that assume that these two variables have long-term cumulative effects do not significantly affect the opinion poll results either. Cross-correlation functions and time series plots indicate that the main peaks in organizational fragmentation and repression seem to have predominantly occurred parallel to, or after the decline in electoral support. If specified as an immediate effect (i.e., in the same time unit), “defection” severely harms the amount of public support. However, one should be cautious with the interpretation of this relationship. Presumably, members and voters reacted simultaneously and similarly—namely, they both ended their support for their party—to an unobserved external event (like the hidden camera story).

Finally, the findings in model 1 undermine the presumed harmful role of a narrowing “political space” for mobilization on the issue of immigration and integration (hypothesis 1A): Janmaat’s popularity was not affected when other political actors publicly expressed negative viewpoints on the multicultural society. Additional analyses (not shown) show that broadening the scope of this variable by also including neutral, ambivalent, and positive
political statements does not change this conclusion. This finding is in line with previous research that found that the number of articles on asylum seekers did not contribute to the explanation of over-time variance in right-wing voting in the Netherlands (Lubbers 2001) or in Germany (Lubbers and Scheepers 2001). At the same time, however, it contradicts Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart’s (2007) finding that immigration news coverage increased support for Dutch anti-immigration parties. It is important to note that their variable “news on immigration” includes what Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2007) label “news on real-world developments,” whereas political claim making on immigration represents a more bounded concept that is similar to “news on issue positions of parties.” These two different types of news do not necessarily coincide. Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder (1997) observed that, until the end of 1993, newspapers and television news contained many stories on asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands, while the major Dutch parties were relatively silent on the issue during that period. Further research on the radical right can thus be improved by testing the “political space” argument and agenda-setting theory together in one framework by including both factual news coverage on immigration and political statements from established parties concerning immigration policies.

Model 2 in table 2 shows that the addition of two control variables does not affect the results. While changes in the influx of asylum seekers yield an insignificant effect, increases in joblessness were beneficial for the CD. Other scholars likewise found that higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for the extreme right (Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996). For this Dutch case, Lubbers (2001) similarly found that when unemployment increased the likelihood of voting for the extreme right was greater; moreover, rising numbers of asylum seekers had no significant effect. The additional analysis of weekly fluctuations (model 3) also confirms my earlier conclusions about the role of the public debate: public criticism and disapproval played a major role in diminishing the extreme-right party’s popularity.

Table 2. Determinants of Public Opinion Support for the Extreme-Right CD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARIMA regression</th>
<th>Model 1 (biweekly)</th>
<th>Model 2 (biweekly)</th>
<th>Model 3 (weekly)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims CD (t-1)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visibility (t-1)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.057***</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative immigration claims (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment (t-1)</td>
<td>0.748**</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.00002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
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<td>Moving average (t-1)</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
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<td>RMS (residual variance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>163</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This article investigates fluctuations over time in the amount of electoral support for the Dutch extreme-right party, Center Democrats, and the party’s ability to express its opinions in the mass media. Previous studies on anti-immigration parties have taken the role of news coverage into account, but have mainly focused on explaining electoral support. I have argued that questions on the extreme-right party’s amount of public claim making should also be addressed.

Demand-side theories stress that unemployment and immigration make voters susceptible to the message of the extreme right. However, the failure of these theories to provide an overall explanation “is clear from even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radical right fortunes found between neighboring states which appear to share similar cultural values, post-industrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy” (Norris 2005: 14). In addition, we need supply-side theories, which emphasize the role of party characteristics (like organizational strength) and political constraints and opportunities. Of course, grievances, ethnic threats, and political opportunities are important for explaining why certain political changes are possible or likely, but they have to be made visible in the public discourse in order to become relevant. Therefore, I have added the argument that publicly visible (rather than latent) factors produce and amplify mobilization of support and attention. This discursive opportunity approach should not be seen as a “rival” theory that displaces existing explanations. Rather, it explains why mobilization can emerge and cease rapidly—on a scale of weeks or months, rather than years.

Results show that it is fruitful to consider short-term dynamics in the public debate in order to fully understand fluctuations in extreme-right support and claim making. With regard to enhancing prominence in the eyes of the media gatekeepers, the findings support the idea that the strategy of putting radical-right actors “in a bad light” is counterproductive. Critical reactions by others in the public debate actually improved CD members’ access to the mass media. Furthermore, it was found that an increase in electoral support did improve the extreme-right party’s ability to make itself heard in the debate. This implies that the electoral growth during the first half of the 1990s amplified the party’s ability to communicate with potential voters.

Importantly, however, negative reactions in the public debate significantly eroded electoral support. Dissonance—the extent to which the public stage offered more space for criticism than for CD claim making—was disastrous for the party’s electoral attractiveness. This conclusion is in line with the finding that a perceived lack of legitimacy among voters diminishes support for populist right parties (Bos and Van der Brug 2010), an insight which could be extended to the analysis of the fortunes of the radical right in other European democracies. Likewise, the combined hostile reactions of political parties, the mass media, and civil society actors led directly to the collapse of the radical-right Republicans in Germany; one of their leaders called the media campaign against the party “our chief problem” (Art 2007: 340).

Remarkably, the CD’s public claim making did not affect the amount of electoral support. The only (external) factor that enhanced Janmaat’s popularity was an increase in joblessness (cf. Lubbers 2001). An increase in the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers did not translate politically into more support for the CD, nor did the amount of political space occupied by the established political actors. In sum, Hans Janmaat appeared trapped in a feedback loop of stagnation: he was not able to further increase electoral support by placing the CD’s topics on the agenda, regardless of how prominently the party’s claims appeared in the media. This is in remarkable contrast to more recent radical-right leaders who clearly profited from media prominence, like Pim Fortuyn (Koopmans and Muis 2009) and Geert Wilders (Bos et al. 2010). Vliegenthart et al. (2012) find that party visibility enhanced electoral support for five of the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated (VB, PVV, Republikaner, NPD, DVU): CD was the one exception. Thus, it is indeed unwarranted to state...
that when the media are willing to grant extreme-right parties a voice, they are always able to achieve electoral breakthroughs (Ellinas 2009).

I expect that the same reservation holds if we focus on the social movement side of the extreme right. Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (2012: 213) conclude that in the countries they studied (Italy, Germany, and the United States) a dominant stigmatization of the extreme right’s racist and antidemocratic claims still seems effective. They point out that groups have strategically adapted their framing and repertoire to the specific discursive opportunities in the three different countries, supposedly in an attempt to broaden their appeal and overcome a negative feedback loop that is similar to the one I described above.

Following a discursive opportunity approach adds two fruitful elements to prevailing explanations for the mobilization of populist right parties and movements. First, the identification of short-term discursive spirals and feedback mechanisms extends the more static demand- and supply-side explanations, which focus on gradual trends and cross-national differences rather than on rapid fluctuations (Norris 2005). It is not clear how relatively stable political and socioeconomic circumstances can explain the sudden mobilization of voters or attention shifts within the space of months. They do not predict a surge in 1994, nor do they explain the sudden collapse shortly after. I share this dynamic view on the analysis of extreme-right breakthroughs with De Witte and Klandermans (2000), who point out that it is difficult to set into motion an upward spiral to overcome organizational weakness. My findings add that another important cause of downward spiral in public opinion support is a lack of “discursive strength.” Even when the CD entered the public stage, with the means to mobilize a wider audience, the party did not achieve much electoral success. To the contrary: once on the stage, the CD suffered from being publicly criticized as an unacceptable racist party. When we compare the demise of the CD with the sudden meteoric rise of the LPF in 2002, it stands out that its leader, Fortuyn, experienced a self-reinforcing spiral of media visibility and electoral popularity (Koopmans and Muis 2009). Consequently, small differences in initial conditions of two parties can generate potentially enormous difference in final outcomes, a phenomenon which is similar to the famous “butterfly effect” in chaos theory. The question remains, if a break of the circle of discursive weakness had been possible, would Janmaat have been inclined to modify his views or reframe his message in order to avoid widespread public disapproval?

Second, a discursive opportunity approach points to the importance of the strategic choices of political players. Mudde (2007) argues that many studies have the tendency to assume that anti-immigration parties are undergoing their fates passively, instead of shaping their own destiny. Likewise, Goodwin (2006: 350) stated that extreme-right parties “should be viewed as engineers of their own success.” Ignazi (2003) and Caiani et al. (2012) similarly argue that extreme-right parties and movements exhibit a strategic flexibility to adapt to whatever favorable circumstances might arise. For example, Coffë (2005) argues that total exclusion has led far-right leaders of the Vlaams Blok to adjust their rhetoric; by softening strongly worded texts they broadened their electoral appeal. If outright racist claims provoke harsh criticism, one would expect that right-wing actors adopt a moderate populist stance in order to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments (Koopmans et al. 2005). Fortuyn perhaps provides an exemplar case: he could have learned from Janmaat’s failures. In any case, his political agenda clearly differed from that of the CD, since he promoted a civic instead of ethnocultural type of nationalism (Akkerman 2005).

It appears that it would not only make sense to differentiate between “normal” and “unacceptable” (Hooghe and Reeskens 2007), “neofascist” and “populist” (Golder 2003), or “classical racist” and “culturally racist” (Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2007) extreme-right parties (despite their common issue agenda). In order to explain why certain parties develop into successful parties, it might also be fruitful to distinguish adaptive parties from ideologically rigid parties. Why certain parties choose a certain strategy remains a pressing question.
## APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE PEARSON CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biweekly Units</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Support CD (%)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>444</td>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
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<td>(5) Repression</td>
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<td>.24</td>
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<td>.55</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>104</td>
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## APPENDIX B. Dickey Fuller (DF) UNIT-ROOT TEST FOR STATIONARITY AND ARIMA MODELS OF VARIABLES (JANUARY 1992 TO MAY 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biweekly Units</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>DF test statistic</th>
<th>ARIMA model</th>
<th>Box-Ljung Q (20 lags)</th>
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<th>DF test statistic</th>
<th>ARIMA model</th>
<th>Box-Ljung Q (20 lags)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for CD (%)</td>
<td>Log Dif</td>
<td>-14.26</td>
<td>MA (1)</td>
<td>21.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-26.94</td>
<td>AR (1,2,3,5)</td>
<td>30.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Immigration claims</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.88</td>
<td>AR (1,2)</td>
<td>16.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td></td>
<td>-15.63</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public claims CD</td>
<td></td>
<td>-16.15</td>
<td>AR (1,5,6,9)</td>
<td>29.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>-14.78</td>
<td>AR (1,5)</td>
<td>23.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance</td>
<td></td>
<td>-14.49</td>
<td>AR (1,2,4,12)</td>
<td>25.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * indicates that the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root at the (p< 0.01) level respectively; the Box-Ljung Q indicates that the residuals are “white noise” (p > 0.05).
NOTES

1 Scholars often use interchangeably the labels “extreme right,” “far right,” and “populist radical right.” Following Arzheimer (2009), Carter (2005), Koopmans et al. (2005), and others, this article will refer to the “extreme right” because it is a label commonly used in recent literature for the party family in question.

2 With thanks to Thom Dyvené de Wit, who was responsible for coding these data.

3 For more information on the sampling procedure and structure of claims, see Koopmans et al. (2005: 254-65). The original dataset is based on a sample: claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the newspaper. I have added claims with the CD as the actor or object from the missing days (using keyword search in the Lexis Nexis database) and have added supplementary information to the original claims (visibility scores, evaluation of the object actors, and specification of the different extreme-right actors).

4 More details about the subsample for the reliability test are provided in Muis (2012). As it concerned 2001/2002, the radical-right party in question was the LPF. The procedure for the coding of political claims was the same, however. Three coders selected 51, 56, and 50 relevant articles, respectively, from a total of 1,472 articles in the newspaper during the three randomly chosen time periods to be coded. Regarding the calculation of the reliability of claim identification, each claim is considered as unique—i.e., each claim has its own unique value.

5 First, it is important to note that the actual variables used in the analysis are created by combining and aggregating various claim variables. For instance, a claim counting as “dissonance” can be established in several ways: an actor can be directly (as addressee) or indirectly (as object) criticized; furthermore, actors can be mentioned as the first or second criticized actor. Second, for the variables “organizational fragmentation” and “repression,” unfortunately no informative reliability measure could be calculated, as these instances did not occur in the sample used for the test. Lack of variability yields an artificially high agreement of 100 percent.

6 This variable is based on a sample in which the claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the newspaper.

7 See McCleary and Hay (1980: 243) for a discussion why “white noise” is necessary and cross-correlations between variables should be uncontaminated by autocorrelation within each series.

8 This confession is not coded as a political claim, as it not a purposive action in the public sphere. All public reactions, however, are coded as claims, such as the public statement of a journalist that the explicit goal of the infiltration was to harm the party.

9 This conclusion is similar when the immigration figures are used, rather than figures for the influx of asylum seekers, or when it is hypothesized that these variables operate with a longer delay (2 or 3 lags).

10 The calculation is as follows: percentage change = \[(\exp(\text{coef}) -1)\]* 100 (McCleary and Hay 1980: 174).

11 The original measure of dissonance (which does not subtract the number of CD claims from the number of critical reactions) yields a similar negative impact. In such a model, due to multicollinearity, the variable claim making has to be excluded from the analysis. Only including claim making (excluding the negative reactions variable) also yields a strong negative effect (not surprisingly, given the correlation).

12 An alternative model with the changes in the amount of immigration instead of asylum seekers also yields insignificant results. Taking more distant lags (2 and 3), assuming that these variables might operate with a longer delay, does not alter the results either.

REFERENCES


