**To vote or to boycott? Social contagion and the electoral uprising of the Iranian Green Movement in the 2013 presidential elections**

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*This is a DRAFT. All comments are very welcome!*

**Abstract**

The unexpectedly high turnout in the 2013 Iranian presidential elections played a decisive role in the surprising victory of Hassan Rouhani. Many opposition supporters suddenly decided to vote, rather than boycott the elections. This paper seeks to explain this electoral uprising of the Iranian Green Movement and focuses on "social contagion" – individuals adopting the attitudes or behavior of others who influence them. We claim that persuasion efforts at the grassroots level explain the emergence of widespread consensus on employing this tactic. Our panel data of IGM supporters reveal that voters were much more active than boycotters in encouraging others to follow their example. The decision to convert from boycotting to participating in the elections was accompanied by a steep increase in the perceived efficacy of elections as a means to influence Iranian politics. These outcomes have important implications for scholars who aim to grasp and model diffusion processes when individuals face two competing tactical choices.

**Keywords**

Social movements, electoral participation, social contagion, social networks, Iranian Green Movement

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To participate in unfair elections or carry out an election boycott? This question poses a recurring dilemma for opposition groups in so-called "mixed", "hybrid" or "competitive authoritarian" regimes that hold manipulated elections to legitimize their rule as democratic, such as Russia, Malaysia, Ghana, and Venezuela (Diamond 2002; Robertson 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010). Also in Iran, the pro-democracy movement has struggled with the issue whether boycotting or electoral participation comprises the most fruitful strategy to influence politics (Kadivar 2012). Until relatively shortly before the presidential elections in Iran on 14 June 2013, many supporters of the pro-democracy movement did not have the intention to participate, on the assumption that the government would rig the elections for a hardliner. At the same time, the Iranian leaders desperately needed a high turnout to secure legitimacy, which was gravely undermined by the violent aftermath of the previous presidential elections in 2009. Then, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected in a vote that many Iranians considered manipulated: their votes were "stolen" as the reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi (who is currently still under house arrest) was denied the victory. In a speech one week before the 2013 elections, Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proclaimed that "the entire world has cast its eyes on these elections" and insisted that "everyone should go to the ballot boxes and show their presence".[2] Thus, with all candidates to be vetted by authorities and an electoral boycott promoted by the opposition, one of the most important struggles between the regime and its challengers in the 2013 elections was about turnout.

To everybody's surprise, the conservative hardliners were defeated and the moderate Hassan Rouhani was elected president by a landslide victory with 50.9% of the vote. He described the stunning outcome as a "as victory of moderation over extremism".[3] At the end of May 2013, polls had indicated that Rouhani was one of the least popular candidates (with only 3% of the vote).[4] Rouhani's triumph would have been inconceivable without support from the Iranian Green Movement (hereafter IGM), the social movement that emerged in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections to challenge the rigged elections and demand more democracy. Hardly anyone had forecasted such a decisively high turnout among opposition supporters. According to Harris (2013a), activists and sympathizers who had participated in the 2009 street protests suddenly took it upon themselves to push a liberal faction to run a united coalition front at the polls. Almost overnight, millions of pro-democratic Iranians decided to vote, and to vote for Rouhani. Only shortly before, many of them had considered participating in "engineered" elections as meaningless or detrimental, like this student for instance:

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[2] See also: "My first and foremost recommendation is participation through the ballot box. This is more important than everything else. It is possible that some people do not want to support the Islamic Republic for any reason, but in any way would like to support their country. Therefore, these people should go to ballot boxes as well" http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1848&Itemid=4.

[3] Rouhani in his first address as elected president: "This victory is a victory of wisdom, a victory of moderation, a victory of growth and awareness and a victory of commitment over extremism and ill-temper". http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/201361523312748181.html

[4] This large-scale field poll (N=15,000) was conducted on May 26th by the Research Center of IRI. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/06/201361135620419515.html

I had made up my mind not to vote," said a young Tehran University student. "How could I, after our votes were taken away in 2009?" She then divulged that on Thursday all of her friends scrambled to find their national identity booklets in order to go to the polls the next morning. (Harris 2013b)

As our empirical data gathered by an online panel survey among the Iranian Green Movement's supporters will show, in February 2013 approximately 53% of them intended to boycott the elections, only 6% intended to go voting, and about 47% was still undecided about whether to participate. Merely four months later, the amount of boycotters had dropped to 25%. At the same time, the actual turnout rate in June 2013 had increased to a stunning 75%. This paper's central question is how to explain this sudden shift from boycotting to electoral participation among the adherents of the Green Movement during the 2013 presidential election campaign.

The unexpected last-minute boost of electoral support for Rouhani underlines once again that so-called "social dynamics from the bottom up" can generate surprising and abrupt changes (Macy and Flache 2009). This unpredictability is mainly due to the fact that individuals do not make decisions in a vacuum: social interactions alter choices. A wealth of empirical evidence has illustrated the ways in which beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour, like infectious diseases, can be contagious. Such "social contagions" feature prominently in both the political science and social movements literature (see e.g. McClurg 2003; Kuran 1995; McAdam 1986; Biggs 2003). Obviously, for contagion to occur, we need channels through which 'infections' are disseminated. Hence, not surprisingly, scholars who study contagion have frequently focused on the role of social networks (see e.g. Siegel 2009; Centola & Macy 2007).

This paper builds further on the academic scholarship on social contagion and contentious politics and makes three important contributions to this literature.

First, we address a striking lacuna in most prevailing work on diffusion processes: it generally seeks to explain the propagation of one single innovation, idea or practice. Instead, two distinct tactics are at stake here: participation in institutionalized electoral politics and participation in noninstitutionalized social movements tactics. We not just have to account for the explosive rise of electoral participation, but at the same time explain why the alternative tactic of boycotting lost out, which initially enjoyed widespread popularity.

Second, by doing so, we link social movement studies with electoral behavior studies. Social movement scholars have focused on the more disruptive forms of collective action and often neglected the electoral channel. Movements can indeed "take the election option" (turn into parties) or engage in electoral mobilization, but there is not yet much systematic work on how social movements affect electoral politics and vice versa (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). This void is striking, particularly given the fact that since 1991 we have experienced a dramatic increase in what Beaulieu (2014: 1-2) calls "electoral protests". She observes an increasingly common trend of opposition-initiated election-related protests, which encompasses both boycotts and demonstrations around election times.

Third, we provide fresh empirical evidence why persuasion crucially matters. In previous diffusion research, the reception has featured prominently. Diffusion is mainly conceived as a process of "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1982) or political learning of the recipients (Kolins, Roberts, and Soule 2010). Surprisingly, the flip side has gained much less attention: convincing others by initiators. Simply being in contact with prior adopters does not necessarily generate further diffusion, particularly when different tactics can be chosen.

At the outset of the Iranian election campaign, contact with proponents of voting was less likely than contact with boycotters, as the former comprised a clear minority. Remarkably,

however, our results indicate that those who voted were much more active in encouraging others to participate in the coming elections as well; boycotters did generally put much less effort in convincing others to follow their example. We argue that these efforts set in motion a self-reinforcing spread of the belief that the electoral route was the most effective and reasonable manner to make one's voice heard. Persuasion at the grassroots level can thus explain why over the course of the campaign, the dominant tactical choice to boycott eventually lost out and electoral participation prevailed.

   This paper will proceed as follows. The next section discusses our theoretical framework and focal questions. Second, we describe our empirical case, the evolution of the Green Movement's vote-boycott dilemma during the 2013 election campaign. Next, we present our research design, which will be followed by the results. Subsequently, we complement these quantitative results with some qualitative evidence obtained from open-ended questions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings.

**Theoretical framework**

We seek to explain how boycotting lost out and massive electoral participation evolved as a result of dynamics and interactions at the grassroots level. Our approach thus revolves around the micro-level dynamics underlying macro-level outcomes. As such, it supplements the prevailing scholarly literature on political contention in hybrid regimes, which predominantly focuses on (1) the role and decisions of opposition groups and its leaders (the meso-level) and (2) on the more stable and long-term structural preconditions that create opportunities for opposition groups to mobilize their constituency (the macro-level) (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Lindberg 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006).

   It is not very likely that boycotting suddenly lost out because individuals independently came up with the same idea that voting provided a better alternative. Indeed, we concur with Biggs (2005) that people often engage in certain collective political behavior because they expect others will do so as well, and not because their grievances or political conditions have fundamentally changed. Consequently, exogenous variables such as economic hardship and political opportunities are unable to fully account for waves of collective mobilization - rapid increases of participation (Biggs 2005; cf. Beissinger 2011). To be able to explain sudden increases in either electoral protests or electoral participation, we rely on the notion of social contagion. Contagion can be defined as "the spread of affect or behaviour from one crowd participant to another; one person serves as the stimulus for the imitative actions of another" (Lindzey & Aronsson 1985: XX).

   Classical theorists such as Le Bon and Tarde viewed contagion with alarm, considering it as the cause of collective madness (Soule 2004). By contrast, following for instance Centola and Macy (2007), we use the term more broadly for the notion that individuals adopt the attitudes or behavior of others who influence them, irrespectively of the question if individuals' choices or outcomes should be labelled irrational or not.[5]

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[5] Scholars often use the terms diffusion and social influence as synonyms for contagion. Stobaugh and Snow (2010: 35) claim that "the contagion concept is now seldom used by students of collective behavior and social movements. Instead, we speak now of diffusion, as it has become the operative, umbrella concept for considering the spread or flow of social behaviors, moods or sentiments, and various cognitions (...) or perspectives among individuals, organizations, and even nations and nationalities." We nevertheless decided to use contagion. The term is still widely used in other fields, such as network studies and political science (see e.g. Watts and Dodds 2007; Nickerson 2008). Second, we explicitly focus on individual-level mechanisms. Diffusion seems to refer more generally to the

Since the classic study of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) on how individual attitudes and behaviors are shaped by interpersonal influence, a plethora of studies have showed that social contagion takes place in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics. For instance, American studies showed that friends and neighbors encouraged one another to go to the polls on election day (McClurg 2004) and field experiments showed that voting is indeed contagious, in the sense that mobilization could spread from person to person within two-person households (Nickerson 2008). Particularly face-to-face mobilization efforts and appealing to social pressure are effective at increasing turnout (Bond et al. 2012). Nevertheless, mass media allow for the possibility of contagion through much more dispersed collectivities than personal networks. Bond et al. (2012) found that political behavior can also spread through online social networks. Contagion also holds for unconventional political mobilization, such as joining strikes, riots, protests or social movements (see e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003; Myers 2000; Biggs 2005; Hedström 2006; Opp and Kittel 2010; Braun and Koopmans 2010).

By increasing the likelihood that others will participate as well, one's decision can have what Oberschall (1994) labels a "multiplier effect". Consequently, collective behavior can rapidly spread from a handful of individuals to a large part of the population. When decisions of citizens are strongly interdependent and conditioned on the expectations about others or prior decisions of others, tiny differences in initial social conditions can thus lead to huge differences in the eventual macro-outcomes, a phenomenon that resembles the famous "butterfly effect" from chaos theory (Watts 2011).

### The role of networks

At the heart of social contagion are social networks, through which information or ideas are transmitted (Burt 1987). If potential adopters do not receive information about others' behavior, they obviously can never imitate it (Myers 2000). Generally, the set of individuals in one's social network is often relatively homogeneous. This tendency that "birds of a feather tend to flock together" implies that potential contagion effects are reduced. When the level of homophily is very high, there will be relatively few links between different subgroups (Centola and Macy 2007). Centola & Macy (2007) suggest that this could have two contrasting effects: having highly connected subgroups helps to spread an innovation quickly within one subgroup, but might make spread between different subgroups more difficult if there are not enough "wide bridges"- multiple connections between two groups of individuals. Therefore, weak ties can be very powerful, in the sense that they connect socially distant locations (Granovetter 1973).

### Simple contagion and complex contagion

In addition to network characteristics, what crucially matters is the way people can get infected. As Gould (2003: 237) notes, it is truism to state that social networks affect mobilization: "It is a bit like noticing that people who are stricken with plague have had contact with other plague victims". The social network alone cannot reveal much about social processes if the interactions between individuals are not clearly specified.

Simple contagion models presume that being in contact with an infected individual makes

it likely that one catches the disease as well (Watts 2004). Hence, one single source is sufficient (the threshold is one). However, it is unlikely that social processes follow this logic of simple contagion. Instead, so-called "complex contagion" seems more plausible, which implies that individuals need multiple sources and only join when a certain number or certain proportion surpasses an individual threshold of two or more sources. This is particular the case when the behavior in question is costly or controversial (Centola & Macy 2007). In that case, individuals must often hear information (or observe behaviour) from a sufficient amount or fraction of friends before they imitate the behaviour in question. Granovetter (1978) showed how in this way a small group of people can trigger a chain reaction, leading to a population-wide cascade of participation. The same logic underlies critical mass theory (Marwell & Oliver 1993), revolutionary surprises (Kuran 1995) and informational cascades (Lohmann 1994).

At this point, however, it is still hard to understand how so many Iranian opposition supporters could shift so rapidly in their opinion about whether to boycott or vote. This is due to the fact that our case profoundly differs from Granovetter's classic threshold model -- and most prevailing diffusion models for that matter -- in three important respects. We will discuss these three differences below.

### The distinction between contagion of ideas and actions

First, the content that is diffused can be either *behavioral* or *ideational* (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010). Even if we presume that those who proclaimed to go to the ballot were more socially embedded than boycotters – and could thus potentially affect a wider group of susceptible people – we have to acknowledge that we deal here with *ideas* that spread, not actual *actions*. Prevailing contagion models often start from the assumption that individuals are able to take into account how much others already actually contributed or undertook a certain collective action (see e.g. Siegel 2009; Epstein 2002; Braha 2012). In contrast, in our empirical case individuals must rely on intentions and expectations about others. Behaviour did not diffuse by some sort of mindless imitation, but this process was mediated through deliberation and the proliferation of ideas.

Therefore, it might be fruitful at this point to introduce the distinction between consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Klandermans 1984; 1992). Consensus mobilization is a deliberate attempt by social movement actors to disseminate its views and obtain support for its viewpoints among (a subset of) the population. Action mobilization refers to the transformation of those who adopted these views into actual participants. It is the process by which organizations call up people to actually undertake action (Klandermans 1984). In our case, this latter type of mobilization seemed less of an obstacle: pro-democratic Iranians were quite prepared to undertake action. The principal issue at stake here was the belief about what comprised the most legitimate and effective strategy to seek to reform the government.

### The spread of one innovation versus two competing tactics

This brings us to our second, and related, point: we deal with *two competing* ideas on what form of collective action one should engage in. We thus improve current diffusion models by investigating the dynamics of contagion when people face not just one, but two conflicting tactical choices: voting and boycotting. People who make claims against powerful adversaries almost always select a tactic from their existing "repertoire of contention", which is the set of

available protest tactics; generally this is a small subset of all possible tactics (Tilly 1978; Soule 2004). As we have just pointed out, the dominant issue at stake here is consensus mobilization. We argue that one's ideas about voting and boycotting is most importantly shaped by two factors: perceived *efficacy* and perceived *legitimacy*.

Obviously, a single opposition vote is not very effective. Likewise, one cannot strike or boycott alone (cf. Biggs 2005). Consequently, politically involved citizens need to strategically consider the actions of other potential participants and they must act in concert in order to exercise any influence. Here, the decision-shaping function of social networks comes in (Passy and Giugni 2001: 130). The embeddedness of actors in social networks has an impact on cognitive individual parameters, such as one's perceived effectiveness of collective action, the assessment of the risks of collective action, one's perceived legitimacy of the authorities, and the perceived constraints. These parameters "are constantly redefined by individuals, a process that is strongly shaped by social relations".

Knowing about a successful or effective tactic is not a sufficient cause to adopt it, as for instance Biggs (2013: 410) points out. Potential protesters must conceive it as legitimate. Legitimacy implies that cultural differences can be insuperable barriers. Innovations that are compatible with the experiences, values, ideas, and needs of activists are more likely to diffuse (Soule 2004: 302). When considering the use of a certain tactic, movement organizers will thus be more likely to adopt it if they have used this type of behaviour in the past.

### *The distinction between communication and persuasion*

The third and arguably most important way in which we extend previous work on contagion is that we point out that the transmitters of innovations need to be active. By contrast, in simple contagion processes neither the adopters nor the transmitters have any interest in the item (idea, tactic, behavior) being diffused (Soule 2004). In political participation however *persuasion* matters. It is not sufficient to just be in contact with infected friends in your network: they need to persuade you. We thus need to theorize about persuasive communication, how beliefs are molded, and why some people are more active. Oliver and Myers (2003) have pointed out that there is an often overlooked but crucial distinction between communication and influence. Similarly, Van Eck et al. (2011) distinguish two types of interpersonal influence: informational and normative. Normative influence entails that people's opinions change in the direction of those with whom they are in frequent contact. Borrowing from Myers (2000), "infectiousness" of an individual refers to how influential the individual's adoption act is on everyone else in the system. Diffusion of information is a different process, more linked to indirect ties than personal ties.

Despite exceptions, the extent to which people actually differ in their efforts and capability to persuade others in their social network has received only scant attention. Empirical work has repeatedly shown that "being asked" is a key determinant of political participation (see e.g. Verba et al. 1995: 3; Klandermans and Oegema 1987), but research has ignored the flip side, the active part of the diffusion of political protest: asking others (Walgrave and Wouters 2014). Walgrave and Wouters (2014: 1673) aptly remark that "if people were only mobilized while not mobilizing others in turn, mobilization would peter out quickly after one round of asking and many possible participants would not be reached." In network simulations a common assumption is that each individual has an equal influence on others (provided that individuals are connected) (see e.g. Centola & Macy 2007). When "elite actors" feature in network simulations, they are

often more influential because of their central position in the network or high number of connections, not because they have better skills or are more active to persuade others (XXX).

In sum, the key question is not only why people adopt a certain tactic, but also why they advertise it. First, why were some individuals more "susceptible" than others to change their opinion from being indecisive or proponent of a boycott to voting? Second, to what extent were some individuals more "infectious" than others? We discuss the specifics of our data and operationalizations to tackle these two focal questions in the context of the electoral uprising of the Green Movement below. First, however, we will explain in more detail the phenomenon of interest here: the rapid and unexpected opinion change among the movement's constituency from boycotting to electoral participation.

**The evolution of the Iranian Green Movement and the voting-boycotting dilemma**

*From moderating elections to meaningless elections*

Robertson (2002) labels the Iranian regime type "competitive authoritarian", which entails that autocrats submit to meaningful multi-party elections but engage in serious democratic abuse. Vetting processes of electoral candidates - undertaken by the Guardian Council - make elections in Iran inherently unfair and undemocratic. Yet, in practice, elections are significantly important for political contenders, particularly those within the system. Elections play a key role in the factional politics of Iran by managing intra-system conflicts and competition and is a consented arena for political settlements in post-revolutionary Iran (Farhi, 2012; Gheissari & Sanandaji, 2009). Elections also attract a considerable amount of attention of the Iranian people, as voting is the major accepted option the government offers to people to influence politics. Participation in elections is actively encouraged by the government; in the eve of elections, propaganda campaigns are run to encourage participation and to show that people enjoy democracy. The relatively high turnout of elections supports the importance of elections, even if unfair, for Iranian people. The turnout in Iran has ranged from about 50 to 80 percent.[6]

The Reformist Movement, which emerged from the landslide victory of Khatami in the 1997 presidential elections, was the first attempt to bring about a democratic change by employing electoral politics in post-revolutionary Iran. However, after two consecutive presidential terms of Khatami, the pro-democratic movement declined when it was defeated by a conservative hardliner, Ahmadinejad, in the 2005 presidential elections. The underlying reason of the defeat was the fragmentation within the movement about the strategic opportunities of electoral politics (Kadivar 2014; Gheissary and Sanandaji 2009). The internal division consequently resulted in the movement's failure to build a coalition on a single tactic (boycotting or voting) and, even within voting advocates, to nominate one single candidate in the elections (Gheissary and Sanadaji 2009).

In 2009, most Iranians, including reformists and regime challengers, again considered the presidential elections as an opportunity for change, by unseating Ahmadinejad and retransferring power to one of the two reformist candidates, Mousavi and Karroubi (Bayat 2013). The large-scale participation of people in numerous public rallies and gatherings in favor of Mousavi raised the hope and expectations amongst opposition supporters and "convinced an increasing number

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[6] The exact figures of the presidential elections (N=9; the turnout of the 2009 presidential elections is excluded) are as follows: min= 50.66%, max= 79.92%, mean= 63.92%; for the parliamentary elections (N=8): min=51.21%, max=71.10% , mean= 59.92%.

of Iranians that Ahmadinejad's victory was not a foregone conclusion" (Ehsani, Keshavarzian, and Moruzzi 2009). However, an "electoral coup d'état" thwarted this outlook.[7] According to the government, Ahmadinejad won the elections with an unexpected and overwhelming 63% of the votes. Many Iranians directly declared the elections were fraudulent and that the basic electoral procedures and laws were violated (see e.g. Ansari, Berman, and Rintoul 2009; Mebane 2009; Roukema 2014). In the wake of the elections, millions of Iranians took to the streets, during which the spectacular Iranian Green Movement (IGM) emerged with the pro-democratic slogan "where is my vote?". This so-called "reactive electoral mobilization" escalated into the most extensive street protests since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979 (McAdam and Tarrow 2010).

The violent crackdown of the protests fundamentally put the importance and significance of elections into question. Political contenders perceived the electoral coup as a message from the government that it had a strong will to transform factional politics to a power monopoly and that any competition, even within the arena of electoral politics, was not accepted.[8] For ordinary people, it proved that voting would not bring about any significant political change.

The parliamentary elections in 2012 were perceived by the IGM's leading activists as "meaningless" and "theatrical".[9] One week before the elections, the Green Movement's highest decision-making body, the Coordination Council for the Green Path of Hope, explicitly called for an election boycott and described boycotting as similar to street protests, both aiming to change a non-democratic polity.[10] It stressed that this decision had been made after extensive consultations with various factions. Many Green Movement activists hoped that the formation of an united coalition on an electoral boycott could revive the movement. However, the last minute decision of Khatami, a prominent leader of the reformists, to vote sparked a fierce debate and broke the unity.[11] His decision raised again the fundamental question whether a genuine change would arise from within or without the system, be brought about by movement politics or electoral politics, and by antagonistic or conciliatory politics.[12] This question thus revolved around the most effective way to influence politics. This debate about the strategy of electoral participation reflected a deeper divide within the Iranian opposition about the most effective strategies to push for democratic reforms (Kadivar 2012).[13]

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[7] The 2009 election has been coined 'electoral coup d'état' for the first time by the main reformist party, Islamic Iran Participation Front, in its first statement after the election and the term is frequently used by other parties and activists to characterize the election and state crackdown. See Islamic Iran Participation Front's statement on 14 June 2014. Retrieved from:
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/2009/groups/iran_participation/Letter-from-Jebheye-Mosharekate-Irane-Eslami-14.6.2009-t.pdf

[8] See for instance an interview with the former leader of the main reformist party, Islamic Iran Participation Front' with Rouzegar newspaper: http://www.kaleme.com/1390/11/16/klm-89795/
And also Mousavi's interview: http://www.4shared.com/document/L29Nrk8D/qalamsabz-003.html

[9] Mohammad Khatami, the former reformist president, said that "running in the elections is 'meaningless' for reformists because the political arena remains closed to open political activity."
See also the statememnt of 'the Coordination Council for Green Path of Hope' about the election (December 31st, 2011): 'Theatrical election' and opportunity for demonding democracy  http://shora.org/2011/12/post.php

[10] The statement of the Coordination Council for Green Path of Hope (February 20th, 2012):
http://shora.org/2012/02/post-21.php. Reformist group calls for boycott of elections, Radio Zamaneh, retrieved from: http://archive.radiozamaneh.com/english/content/reformist-group-calls-boycott-elections

[11] http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2012/mar/05/mohammad-khatami-iran-election

[12] http://www.khatami.ir/fa/news/1071.html , http://www.khatami.ir/fa/news/1073.html

[13] http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-election-president-/24975986.html

The boycott of the 2012 parliamentary election had not resulted in any achievements, in the sense that it did not revitalize and unite the opposition movement. During the last months of 2012, the IGM did not organize any public demonstration and there was barely hope for a successful protest mobilization. Furthermore, state surveillance and severe repression of activists and any anti-regime activities made any mobilization unlikely, mainly because the leaders who had the potential ability to mobilize people were under house arrest.

### *The run-up to the 2013 elections: factions in the Green Movement*

At the onset of the 2013 election campaign, the disintegrated alliances resembled the situation in the eve of 2005 presidential elections, when the Reform Movement had been fragmented into two competitive camps: those who pursued electoral politics and movement-centered reformists who boycotted the elections to delegitimize the government and promote "society-driven" change (Kadivar 2013). Given the ineffectiveness of movement politics, the election-centered reformists, headed by Khatami, seemed in a better position.

Although there were neither signals that the government had the intention to hold fair elections, nor societal signals of enthusiasm to participate in the elections, a group of young activists urged Khatami to run in the 2013 presidential election (March 2013). They believed that a candidate with a strong appeal could convince people to participate in the election and also reunite the movement factions in one strategy (namely, the electoral route).[14] This marked a new period in the presidential campaign: Khatami's candidacy was accepted even by movement-centered factions, as they hoped to utilize the elections to turn their covert activities into an overt mobilization. On the last day of the candidates' registration period, Khatami cancelled his candidacy, due to threats and pressure from hardliners, but Hashemi, another former president, registered at the very last moment (May 11th). Hashemi's announced candidacy encouraged many to participate in the elections. Major opposition groups, even radicals, welcomed it. Surprisingly, however, the Guardian Council disapproved Hashemi's candidacy (May 21st). This decision disappointed many and strengthened the position of the movement-centered faction vis-à-vis the election-centered faction.[15] Hereafter, the election-centered reformists remained relatively silent and radical movement-centered activists launched the boycott campaign, utilizing satellite television broadcasts based outside Iran. Only one week before the elections, the more moderate political groups within the Green Movement also reluctantly called for an election boycott (June 9th).[16] We have summarized the most significant actions and events during the 2013 election campaign in Box 1.

**Box 1.** Timeline of Iranian presidential election campaign 2013.

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[14] Jalaeipour, M. (2013) Forty reasons in necessity of Khatami's candidacy. http://www.rahesabz.net/story/67415/

[15] Jalaeipour, H.: Among the reformists in the past four years, two approaches 'election-centered' and 'movement-centered' exists. The former one wants to solve the country's problem through the parliamentary, presidential and council election. But the latter approach which emerged from 2009 relies on social forces. Disapproval of Hashemi and the current status of the election strengthened the movement-centered approach. Interview with Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, sociologist and prominent reformist activist, one day after the disapproval of Hashemi. Retrieved from: http://www.irangreenvoice.com/article/2013/may/28/34335

[16] http://shora.org/2013/05/post-949.php

**Mar 8, 2013**: a group of young reformists and Green activists run a campaign to urge Khatami, a prominent leader of the reformists, to 2013 presidential election candidacy. It is started by releasing an statement titled 'Forty reasons in necessity of Khatami's candidacy'.

**May 7, 2013**: The official registration of candidates began

**May 11, 2013**: End of registration time. / Khatami declined to register due to threats and pressure from hardliners / Hashemi, former president and influential moderate politician, registered at the very last moment

**May 21, 2013**: The final list of candidates was announced / Hashemi disqualified by the Guardian Council

**May 24, 2013**: Official Propagation Campaigns of eight candidates began

**May 31, 2013 – Jun 7, 2013**: Three Live presidential debates in National TV (IRIB) were held (on economic/ cultural and domestic and foreign policy)

**Jun 9,2013**: The coordination Council for Green Path of Hope, the Green Movement's highest decision-making body, called for boycotting with an statement: ""

**June 10, 2013**: Aref, who defined himself as reformist candidate, withdrew from the presidential race. / the Advisory Council of Reformists, which had been organized and headed by Khatami, announced their support for Rouhani, the moderate independent candidate. (Announcement number 4)

**June 11, 2013**: Khatami declared support for Rouhani.

**June 13, 2013**: End of electoral campaigns.

**June 14, 2013**: The balloting day.

**June 15, 2013**: Results were announced. / Rouhani won the 2013 presidential election with 50.8 percent of votes.

### *A top-down boycott and bottom-up uprising of electoral participation*

Meanwhile, several young activists, who had been formed around the "campaign for inviting Khatami to candidacy", had still been active in the electoral campaign gatherings and rallies of Rouhani and Aref; the former defined himself as reformist and the latter as moderate. As a result of the rapid dispersion of these campaigning activities through informal and online networks and of the live debates between presidential candidates on national television, IGM supporters increasingly focused their attention on these two candidates. Campaigners and activists urged Khatami and Hashemi to publicly announce their support for one of the two candidates and asked the two candidates to ally. On June 10th, Aref finally withdrew his candidacy. Subsequently, merely four days before the elections, The Advisory Council of Reformists, headed by Khatami, announced its support for Rouhani. This decision was made since "the social demand for far-reaching effects on the outcome of the elections in spite of all limitations and concerns had been increased" and "the coalition of two candidates as a public and national

demand was discussed everywhere".[17] Some moderate political groups supported Khatami's call and likewise urged to take part in the ballot, while movement-centered groups held on to their decision to boycott.

It is important to stress that this call seemed to have mainly followed the opinion shift among the Green Movement supporters, instigated from the bottom-up, rather than that it suddenly caused a major change in the minds of many pro-democratic Iranians (Shirazi 2013). Prominent agents of the election, among others, Rouhani and Khatami have admitted the key role of the youth and online social networks. For instance, in the first press conference as the president of Iran, Rouhani declared that the people's activities in streets, gatherings, assemblies and cyberspace had been astonishing.

In fact, during the run-up to the 2013 elections, the boycott-vote dilemma had mainly left the two factions of the Green Movement inert and indecisive until the last days. Both camps tried to save their "social credits" among the Green Movement supporters and hesitated to push for a tactic that was not fully backed by support from below (Akbari 2013). All in all, commentators and scholars are still scrambling to understand this bottom-up transformation: why did the public opinion among the Green Movement supporters shift so rapidly and so dramatically from boycotting to electoral participation? Put differently, how did this surprising electoral uprising come about?

**Research design**[18]

*Data*

In closed societies where expressing critical views is likely to be punished by the government, and where mass media are ceaselessly suppressed and censored, conventional sociological methods such as face-to-face surveys, newspaper content analysis, and on-site observation – particularly to acquire data of dissidents - are problematic or even impossible. In these circumstances, people have the tendency to falsify their publicly expressed preferences (Kuran 1995). To overcome these limitations, we used online surveys to ensure respondents could participate anonymously. This online survey was conducted in three waves in 2013: in February, April, and June.

The target group of our study were IGM supporters who had participated in pro-democratic protests in the past. The IGM does not have any formal organization and formal members. Its constituency predominantly consists of the people who supported the reformist candidates in the 2009 elections (Mousavi and Karroubi). The mobilization for and participation in IGM's protests are mostly undertaken by informal and unaffiliated activists or ordinary citizens. To reach to this group, we used the same network that is usually used for mobilization to distribute the online questionnaire and recruit participants.

During the first wave in February 2013, the online questionnaire was openly distributed via online social networks and via personal e-mail lists. To build trust and assure respondents that participation would be safe, the strong ties of the online networks were used. We asked online activists, bloggers, and administrators of Facebook pages to distribute the online questionnaire with some encouraging and trusting words. In this first wave, respondents were also asked to write down their e-mail address to track them for later waves. Of the 1051

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[17] Announcement number 4, Advisory Council Reformists. 10 June 2013, http://www.khatami.ir/fa/news/1176.html
[18] For more detailed information on the research project, see: XXXXX

respondents who completed the survey, about 500 provided us with their e-mail address. This shows that the strategy of using strong ties worked, as approximately 50 percent of the respondents completely trusted the online survey.

In the subsequent two waves (in April and in June), the online questionnaire was sent to the list of e-mail addresses acquired from the first wave. Of the 500 targeted respondents from first wave, 40% participated again in both the second and third wave. Our panel data thus consists of 200 respondents who participated in the survey three times (February, April and June 2013).

Moreover, in the last wave, shortly after the presidential elections in June 2013, the online questionnaire was also distributed more widely in the similar way that the first wave had been done. In total, 1049 participants completed the third wave survey. In total, we thus gathered three datasets: W1 (N= 1051), W3 (N=1049), and the panel data (N=200). In this research we excluded respondents who live outside Iran (N=43) from analyses.

*Measurements*

*Dependent variables*

Our main point of interest is what tactic people adopted (voting or boycotting), and, equally important, when. The *voting intention* and *actual voting* was asked by the straight-forward questions "Will you vote at the next presidential election?" (V5040) and "Did you vote in the recent presidential election (2013)?" (V5100), respectively. With regard to the voting intention, besides yes/no, respondents could report they were 'undecided'. We only included eligible respondents of 18 years and older in our sample. In W3, immediately after the elections, we also asked the participants' *decision timing* with the item "When did you decide to vote?" (V5150), which contained six categories: before the candidate registration; before the Guardian Council announcement; after the TV debates; the last week of electoral campaign; one day before the elections; balloting day.

In the third wave, we also asked the voters and non-voters "Why did you participate in the recent elections?" and "why did you not participate in the recent elections?" respectively. These two questions were open-ended. Based on the answers respondents provided, we can infer that the overwhelming majority of the non-voters indeed abstained for political reasons. We can thus safely label them as 'boycotters'. People who did not cast a vote for other reasons are excluded from our analyses of boycotters in the remainder of the paper.

*Explanatory variables*

The tables presented in Appendix A provide detailed information on the operationalization (question wording and answer categories) of the independent variables and control variables and Appendix B shows the descriptive statistics of all these variables.

The first set of independent variables all relate to network channels. Diffusion can be mediated by direct and indirect channels (Soule 2003). Direct channels refer to relational ties and indirect channels refers to media and the sense of shared identification (or "group identification") which are non-relational. We have thus distinguished, following Andrews & Biggs (2006), four channels of diffusion: organizations, informal social networks, (social) media, and shared identification.

First, *organizational embeddedness* (or "formal social networks") refers to the networks

intentionally created by organizations and communication mechanisms that connect dispersed members/affiliates of organizations. We asked respondents whether they had been involved in a list of 12 organization types in the previous two months, and if they furthermore could indicate whether they were a passive member or an active member (V6601 to V6613). We merged these items into four different types of organizations, namely political parties, emergent electoral campaigning groups, indirectly political groups (such as student's organizations and women's organizations), and non-political groups (such as charity organizations). We also defined the overall degree of formal embeddedness as the sum of all organization types that one is a member of. In total we thus composed five variables: Degree of formal emebeddedness, Political Groups membership, Emergent Electoral Campaigns membership, Indirectly Political Groups membership, and Apolitical Groups membership.

Second, *informal embeddedness*, or what Opp and Gern (1989) label "personal networks", refers to the social networks of ordinary life, such as contacts with relatives, friends, and colleague. Our measurement consisted of three items: "When you get together with your friends, relatives, or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?" (V6701),"How many people in your circle of friends [/colleagues/family] criticize the current political situation in Iran?" (V6702) and "How many people in your circle of friends [/colleagues/families] have been politically active in the previous two months" (V6703). By these three variables we make distinction between the potential of using network for political purposes (V6701) and the potential of being imposed by political activities of others in your network (V6703). We also make distinction between political activeness of your social network (V6703), and the amount of contacts per se (V6702). Criticizing politics or being dissatisfied about politics does not necessarily has the same effect of intentionally being active and persuading others.

In contrast with most prevailing research on social movement participation, in our case the effect of so-called "social incentives" (Opp and Kittel 2010) is not self-evident. Conventionally, the number of memberships in protest encouraging groups or the number of critical friends or colleagues increases social incentives, which, in turn, enhance the engagement in protest activities. In our case, however, without the wisdom of hindsight it is hard to say beforehand that 'talking politics' will foster engagement in one of the two conflicting types of participation (voting and boycotting).

Third, one's connection to (social) media channels was measured in several different ways. **Online embeddedness** was measured with the following item: In how many political groups, pages, and circles in online social networks are you an active member? (V6706).

Furthermore, we also gauged the general intensity of online behaviour, which has no clear and direct conceptual relationship with interaction with salient others in your online network. We used two variables: **general internet usage** (In the previous two months, how much time did you on average spend using the Internet? (on average)) (V7110) and **political internet usage** (In the previous two months, how much time on average did you spend using the Internet for social-political purposes (on average)?) (V7120).

We asked respondents also more generally which sources they relied on to follow the political news and events. We identified the most important channel political news channel by providing a list of sources and asking which of the following political news sources respondent deemed the most important for them. We label this variable **most important media source for political purposes.**

Fourth, **group identification** was measured with the following item "Some people identify with some social movements, others do not, to what extent do you identify with …". The

respondents were asked to choose from not at all to very much for 13 different movement such as: The Iranian Green Movement; Reformist Movement; Women's Movement; Human Rights Movement etc. **Group politicized identity** is also measured by averaging all 13 items ($\alpha$ =.824).

As explained in the theoretical background, we assume that two factors play a key role when accounting for the fact why some individuals were more susceptible to be convinced of voting than others: legitimacy and efficacy. First, we gauged one's perceived legitimacy for radical versus moderate tactics by a variable that we will label **tactical choices.** We asked: "To improve the aforementioned situation of Iran, which tactics do you support for change?" Respondents had to choose a position on a scale for three adjective pairs: revolutionary vs. reformist, non-violent vs. violent, and short-term vs. long-term. Second, to measure **efficacy** we distinguished between group efficacy and individual efficacy of political activities (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg 2005; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007). The efficacy of electoral politics is therefore measured by two questions: "To what extent do you think that elections contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran?" (V6403, group efficacy) and "To what extent do you think that your vote matters?" (V6406, individual efficacy).

Finally, to assess the infectiousness of individuals, in the third wave we used the following two distinct items for voters and non-voters, respectively: "To what extent were you active in encouraging others to participate in the elections?" (V5170) and "To what extent were you active in encouraging others not to participate in the elections?" (V5171). These items will be denoted with the label **encouraging others**.

Operationalization of other variables can be found in Appendix A.

### *Control variables*

We included a host of general individual characteristics that could possibly be associated with both our independent and dependent variables. *Political interest* (V1400) was measured with the item "How interested are you in politics", whereby the four answer categories ranged from "never" (1) to "a lot" (4). Furthermore, we included five socio-demographic in the analysis as controls: the respondent's *age* (in years); *gender* (V1100) (0=male; 1=female); town of residence (1 Tehran; 2 large cities; 3 small cities; 4 Towns and Villages; 5 No Answer) and subjective social class (People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the (1 Upper Class; 2 Upper Middle Class; 3 Lower Middle Class; 4 Working Class; 5 Lower Class; 6 None)).

### Results

Figure 1 and 2, which are based on the panel data (n=157), depict the remarkable shift from boycotting to voting. They reveal a steep increase in the number of respondents who intended to participate in the elections between February and June 2013. The right-most bar in Figure 1 (W3) shows that about three quarters of our respondents actually went to the ballot on election day (75.2%). In sharp contrast, the central bar (W1) shows that in February 2013 only about 6.4% of the respondents intended to participate. In April (W2) this figure had risen to about 15.3% per cent, but boycotters still clearly outnumbered those who intended to vote: at that time, approximately 40% of the respondents intended to boycott the coming elections. The remainder of the Green Movement's constituency in our sample was still indecisive whether to participate

or not.

Figure 2 provides more insight into *when* the respondents who voted decided to do so, thus at what moment they changed their opinion from either boycotting or being indecisive to electoral participation. We clearly discern an exponential growth pattern. The two first observations in the Figure represent two questions about the voting intention in February (W1) and April (W2), respectively. The other observations are based on the measurement of the voters' decision timing in June ("When did you firmly decide to go voting?").

Figure 1 about here

Figure 2 about here

It is important to note that the electoral uprising is equally striking if we zoom out to consider the trend over a longer period of time. The first bar in Figure 1 shows that 85.9% of our respondents participated in the notorious 2009 presidential elections; only a small minority did not vote (14.1%). By contrast, the second bar in Figure 1 shows that an overwhelming majority of 93% reported that they did not vote in the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. Apparently, following the blatant ballot-rigging in 2009, the widespread opinion was that participation in elections was useless or even detrimental to the pro-democracy movement.

More detailed descriptive results (not shown in Table) reveal that our sample contains pro-democratic Iranians: in the 2009 elections, almost all participants (96.3%) from inside Iran either voted for Mousavi (70.3%) or Karroubi (11.9%) and in 2013 almost all voted for Rouhani (99.1%). The majority of them (84.9%) reported that they participated in political activities in the aftermath of the 2009 elections.

Having revealed details on the explanandum, we now focus on how to account for this rapid and unexpected opinion shift from boycotting to electoral participation among the pro-democracy movement's constituency. We will disentangle this puzzle into several steps.

### Who decided early to go voting? (February and April 2013)

We start with the following question: who was more likely to already opt for electoral participation at an early stage? We have just shown that initially, i.e. in February 2013, the group of IGM supporters who intended to vote in the 2013 presidential elections formed a very small minority. Who were these so-called innovators and early adopters? What distinguished this group from the rest of the Green Movement, i.e. the boycotters and those who were still undecided?

Given the fact that voting eventually prevailed, one might suspect that those who already proclaimed to go to the ballot at the onset of the election campaign were more socially embedded than boycotters – and could thus potentially convince a wider group of people in their network. Table 1 however shows that in February 2013, the three groups (voters, boycotters, and those who were undecided) did not differ in terms of their social embeddedness. Our results reveal that they only differed on the item "How many people in your circle of friends, colleagues and family criticize the current political situation in Iran?". Early adopters of voting were generally embedded in a less aggrieved social environment than boycotters and undecided people. In line with this finding, the results show that voters were less angry than boycotters, and were more

hopeful.

Not surprisingly, the results show that voters perceived a higher level of individual and collective efficacy of the elections than boycotters. Furthermore, being interested in politics is significantly associated with electoral participation. As expected, the large and significant difference in opinion about tactical choices means that voters generally deemed revolutionary, short-term tactics much less legitimate to bring about political change in Iran in comparison with boycotters. Those who were still undecided in February take an intermediate position between the two extremes in this regard. Finally, it is interesting to note that the idea of voting clearly emerged among those who identify with the Reformist Movement (the moderate pro-democracy groups within the IGM). At the same time, the results show that those individuals who intended to participate in the elections identified themselves significantly less with the IGM than boycotters and those who were still undecided.

To assess the robustness of these findings based on the panel data (N=157), we have replicated the analysis with our larger sample from wave 1 (N=746). The result are depicted in Appendix XXX and yield the same conclusions.

Table 2 depicts the differences between voters, boycotters and undecided in April, which was still more than two months before the elections. The group of voters has increased, but the findings show that the picture as described above has only changed to a small extent. The significant difference with regard to the item on the perceived grievances in one's social environment has disappeared. Interestingly, the membership of political groups is now significantly associated with the intention to take part in the ballot.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

### Who eventually participated in the elections? (June 2013)

Now let us consider the actual elections that took place in June 2013. What distinguishes those who decided to vote from the boycotters? Table 3 shows the means of the two groups (voting and non-voting). The results are largely in line with the previous findings on the group differences at earlier points in time. First of all that, they reveal again that people who prefer gradual, reformist tactics had a higher propensity to vote than those who deem radical/revolutionary tactics more desirable. We observe again that boycotters are more angry, whereas people who voted were more hopeful about Iran's current situation.

Concerning the impact of embeddedness in networks, it is remarkable that several of the "usual suspects" did not affect the likelihood to cast a vote. The findings indicate that voters were generally not more strongly embedded in social networks than boycotters. For instance, voting is unrelated with membership in political or apolitical organizations. However, voters were more *active* and more involved in *active* networks. The results show, for instance, that voters have discussed more often about politics with others, and that they have used the internet more often for political purposes during the previous two months. In a similar vein, more precisely newspapers and online social networks, to follow the political news and events is significantly associated with electoral participation. People who were less inclined to closely follow the news might not have fully caught the last-minute uproar around the electoral uprising.

When considering group identification, it is interesting to note the difference between the Reformist Movement identifiers and Green Movement identifiers. In contrast to the situation in

February, those who strongly identified with these groups more often participated in the elections than those who identified less with one of these two movements.

Again, we have assessed the robustness of our findings and replicated the analysis with our larger sample in June (N=722). The results are shown in Appendix XXX. They largely lead to the same conclusions. Some minor differences that were already manifest yet insignificant, now prove to be statistically significant: the usage of internet news websites is associated with voting and younger people were more inclined to participate.

Table 3 about here

### *Why people converted? The role of efficacy and legitimacy*

Next, using the panel structure of our data, we shift our attention to the reasons why people actually changed from (intended) non-participation to participation, or remained instead "nonadopters" and "resistant" to the spread of the voting tactic. Tables 1, 2 and 3 have revealed insights into the factors that were associated with the intention or decision to either vote or boycott. We will now consider to what extent the absolute levels of the significantly related factors did actually change over time. The overall means of all variables for the three waves are depicted in Table 4.

Let us take a closer look at both efficacy and legitimacy. Table 4 shows that the average perceived collective efficacy of electoral politics in February 2013 was 2.48 (on a 1-5 scale). As we just have highlighted above, we observed a large difference between voters ($M = 2.80$) and boycotters ($M = 1.90$) in the first wave. Interestingly, we can discern that the perceived efficacy of the electoral route dramatically increased between February and June 2013. In June, the overall average had augmented to 3.22. Moreover, Table 3 has showed that the gap between the now much larger group of voters ($M = 3.54$) and decreased group of boycotters ($M = 1.64$) has widened. Likewise, the average individual efficacy of voting has risen over time from 2.02 to 3.06. The difference between voters and boycotters has remained similar over time. Whereas in February the two groups score 3.30 and 1.35, respectively, in June for both groups the individual efficacy of voting has risen to 3.54 and 1.64 (see Tables 1 and 3).

Interesting, regarding the tactical preferences (perceived legitimacy), we observe only a relatively minor shift towards more moderation (from 2.03 to 1.74). This makes intuitively sense. The massive shift in the actual tactical decision was arguably shaped by pragmatism and interdependence. It could thus go hand in hand with much more stability in the more deep seated convictions.

Table 4 about here

But there is more. To provide more insight in why some people shifted their opinion, we grouped respondents in the panel, based on their intention to vote or not in the first wave of the survey (W1) and their actual decision to vote or not in the elections (W3). This indicates that only 7% (N=10) of the respondents who went to the ballot box in June, had already reported the intention to do so in February. Including the respondents who were undecided, the following four groups can be distinguished:[19]

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[19] Only XXX respondents shifted from undecided to boycotting. More detailed information can be found in Table C1 in Appendix C.

Group 1 (n=10): vote intention - voted
Group 2 (n=75): undecided - voted
Group 3 (n=54): boycott intention - voted
Group 4 (n=46): boycott intention - boycotted

The results depicted in Table 5 show how the sense of efficacy changed over time for these four groups. For ease of interpretation, we have also plotted the data in Figures 3 and 4. In this regard, the most interesting group of respondents consists of those who initially intended to boycott the elections, but eventually decided to cast a vote after all (group 3). Most importantly, the results show that this group experienced the most remarkable rise in both individual and collective efficacy. Still at the same very low level as the stubborn boycotters who stuck to their views in February, their optimism in the electoral route has steeply increased within a few months and made them much more similar to the stubborn voters in this respect. Hence, a large part of the "disobedient" radicals, one could argue, fundamentally changed their disposition. However, Figure 5 tells a somewhat different story. It shows that the converted boycotters already significantly deviated from the rigid ones in their perceived legitimacy in February 2013. The former group was thus already more willing to comply and participate in an inherently unfair system, and the latter more inclined to instead consider more antagonist and revolutionary tactics as the rightful way of protesting against the authoritarian establishment.

Table 5 about here

Figure 3 about here

Figure 4 about here

Figure 5 about here

### *Who encouraged others to follow his/her example? The role of persuasion*

Finally, we will focus on the activeness of the "senders" in persuading others, or, put differently, the "infectiousness" of individuals. After the elections (W3), we asked respondents to what extent they had been active in encouraging others to either participate in the elections, or to boycott. Remarkably, we find a large difference in this respect: the voters reported to have been much more active (*M*= 3.76, *SD*=1.09) than the boycotters (*M*= 2.21, *SD*=1.23). This difference is highly significant (xxxxx).

Furthermore, using the panel data, we examined the extent to which our respondents were actively engaged in encouraging others to follow their example, sorted by group. The results are depicted in Figure 6. It reveals that voters who already intended to go to the ballot box in February (N=10) have been the most active in encouraging others to vote as well (*M*= 4.40, *SD*=0.97). By contrast, people who intended to abstain in February and eventually indeed boycotted the elections (N=46), were the least active in encouraging other people to follow their example (*M*=2.13, *SD*= 1.08). The other two groups (undecided--voted and boycott intention--voted) score in between these two extremes. Obviously, particularly this last group has had less opportunity to be active and persuade others to vote, since at the onset of the campaign they were themselves still hesitant about whether to boycott or not. It is interesting to note that after all, that

even the group of people who completely shifted their opinion from boycotting to voting was overall still much more active than the hardcore boycotters.

Figure 6 about here

Encouraging others can imply many different activities. Tables 6 and 7 present a list of items on political participation in offline and online activities, respectively. We split up the figures again into the four groups as explained earlier. The results, simply put, lead to two interesting conclusions about differences between groups and differences over time. First, we observe a general trend towards more participation when the elections come closer, also for activities that Western scholars would not necessarily relate to participation in electoral politics, or perhaps would even consider as a substitute for it, such as demonstrating in street protests and marches. In this sense, our results are in line with Tucker's claim that (upcoming) elections in authoritarian regimes have a "signaling function" and provide a focal point for individuals with already-existing political grievances to overcome collective action problems (Tucker 2007).

Second, in line with our previous findings, the results indicate that the voters have generally been much more active than the boycotters. Moreover, in many important respects even the boycotters who "lost their faith" (group 3) were more active than the stubborn boycotters (group 4). This is important to note for two reasons: being more actively engaged and having more interactions with others probably made them more "susceptible" to change their tactic. At the same time, being more active suggests that they were more "infectious" and influential for others. To provide some details about the latter: with regard to attempting to change someone's mind about political issues by talking face to face (item xx) and encouraging others to attend events or support activities by talking face to face (item xx), group 3 scores on average 3.29 and 2.88, respectively, whereas group 4 scores 2.55 and 2.19. The same conclusion holds for online persuasion, instead of by face to face (see Table 7).

Table 6 about here

Table 7 about here

**Qualitative evidence on social contagion**

We turn now to some qualitative evidence on the dynamics of contagion, drawn from the answers on the open-ended questions. As we will see, scrutiny of this material will further enhance our understanding of the social influence processes at work during the run-up to the elections and strengthen our confidence in the quantitative findings we discussed above.

We have just shown that perceived legitimacy and perceived efficacy were significantly associated with one's decision to either vote or abstain. The pivotal role of these two factors in the decision-making process is reflected in several answers. The importance of individual efficacy for undertaking action can be nicely illustrated by this explanation of a voter: "The destiny of the country is written by each and every individual; and I am one of them" (F, 25, Tehran, translator). For some people, it was obvious which tactic is most effective in shaping that destiny. One voter, for instance, stated that "Inaction will yield nothing. Not voting could be considered as (indirectly) protesting to the current situation, but it is not a political action" (M, 37, Tehran, physician). However, most individuals were not so unequivocal in their reflection on their decision. Boycotting, the data indicate, is often about preserving one's moral dignity. Thus,

several respondents admit to have been struggling with the question what comprises the most fruitful and righteous action. This 36-year-old student, for instance, writes the following:

> "Speaking from a moral perspective, for me and many others, it was hard to decide to participate, given the bloody crackdown on the protesters after the previous elections. What is more, there was widespread doubt about the efficacy of the elections given the possibility of election-engineering. On the other hand, I reckoned boycotting the elections to be completely ineffective." (M, 36, Tehran, student)

It is important to observe that abstention for political reasons is not necessarily deemed the same as boycotting:

> "Until the last days leading to the elections, I had no intention of participating, but not out of a boycott attitude, but more out of a dejected attitude that could see no hope for change in the situation. For this reason, I sympathized with both the prospective voters who wanted to vote and enter another political gamble and also those who were refraining from voting. (M, 35, Ghazvin)

This quote also elucidates our finding that those who intended to vote were much more active in encouraging others, whereas those who boycotted put much less effort in convincing others to follow their example. Apparently, impotence and hopelessness are not very convenient products to advertise. And as we have seen, this disposition was more prominent among boycotters.

However, it is important to note that many voters were not optimistic either, as they did not believe that a moderate candidate would win power. Nevertheless, the expectation that the counting of the votes would probably be unfair did not hamper the motivation to persuade others to vote: even then, voting could be effective, in the sense that it would make it more difficult for the regime to get away with fraud:

> "Although my prediction was that a conservative, Osoulgara, would win the elections at any costs, I tried to convince other people to vote to increase the costs of engineering the election for the regime, in case that engineering the election was their intention, which would have been very easy for them without widespread participation of the people." (M, 28, Pardis, Architect)

> "Early on I had no intention of participating. But after the announcement of the names of the candidates, we arrived at the conclusion that by participating in the elections and encouraging others to do so, we would be increasing the costs of possible fraud in the election for the regime." (xxxxx)

It should be stressed that it was not self-evident to persuade others:

> "I see the only way forward for progress to be piecemeal reform. The only reason why I did not want to vote was to respect the spilled blood of those who died following the previous elections. A little bit afterwards, I thought that this election is about bringing the type of change demanded by those who got killed in the aftermath of the previous election in 2009. Therefore, I decided to participate but never tried to change the attitude of the pro-boycott people around me. (xxxxxx)

Let's shift our attention to the receptive side. For several respondents, the fact that voting eventually prevailed was indeed shaped by online communication and talks with others in one's network. For instance, one respondent succinctly explained his decision to vote as follows: "The discussions on Google+ convinced me that the general consensus is in favor of voting" (M, 33, Isfahan, worker). People living abroad were also affected. Here are two quotes from people from outside Iran, to illustrate that social influence also crossed the country borders:

> "I was against voting, but, after following Facebook discussions and talking to friends inside the country I arrived at the conclusion that even if there is one glimmer of hope for change in the political system, it is only possible through voting and participation. Otherwise, it would be a case of leaving the political realm to the enemy without any fight and struggle and could lead to a pathetic loss. Therefore, hoping for change, albeit slow and piecemeal, I voted for Mr. Rouhani" (M, 41, U.K., financial manager)

> "... my shaken morale prevented me from joining the pro-participation camp. I decided to vote when my father called me from Iran and told me that my family would be voting" (1, 25, U.K., freelance designer)

The driving force behind being susceptible to social influence is the awareness that that the pro-democracy movement must first and foremost act in concert. The imperative that one should not make choices independently and in isolation from others is manifested by the many references to strive for solidarity and stand together. This voter, for instance, put the reason he participated simply as follows: "Out of solidarity with friends and acquaintances" (M, 39, Tehran, Engineer). Another respondent voted "In order to create an unbreakable solidarity between the people (…)" (M, 29, Tehran, teacher). A few more quotes:

> "There were not and are not available means to successfully boycott the election. With strong doubts but abundant hopes I decided to participate. Participation had the promise of recreating and reenergizing the solidarity among the people, something that boycotting the elections would be unable to achieve." (M, 34, Italy, researcher)

> "Because a large body of the Green Movement decided, for better or worse, to participate in the elections. In this situation, I found not voting to be an unfruitful act of undermining solidarity among people, whose consequences would have been worse than losing in the elections." (M, 29, Tehran, Art and cinema researcher)

Several accounts lend support to our argument that the emergence of a united tactic was driven by "the people", rather than by a top-down process. Typically, respondents use terms such a "social currents"(in Farsi: *Jaryaane ejtemaei*) and "collective wisdom"(in Farsi: *Aghle Jamei*) to describe the public opinion. For instance, one respondent notes that "people's moods changed and the collective wisdom of the country showed that they could create difficulties for the regime" (M, 33, Tehran, writer). Two others explained to have voted "Because a coalition was formed that was the outcome of the collective wisdom of the people" (F, 54, Tehran, teacher) and "To be in solidarity with currents of hope and change and rejecting Ghalibaf and Jalili" (F, 32, Tehran, employee). Here is another telling example:

"To support the social currents inside the country, currents that were formed by the people in the last days leading to the elections, the people who had paid dearly for their previous political actions but still decided to participate in the elections." (M, 35, United Kingdom, journalist)

To sum up, our analysis is line with our argument that the opinion dynamics were shaped at the grassroots level. Finally, it should be also pointed out that in some accounts the decisions at the meso-level play an important role. For votes to be influential, unity was required. Thus, electoral mobilization accelerated when Aref pulled out from the race, and the pro-democracy votes were solidified behind one candidate: Rouhani.

"My participation in the elections was dependent on the consensus of the reformists. When Aref stepped aside in favor of Rouhani, I made the decision to participate." (M, 38, Tehran, employee)

"After weeks of discussion and debates in social networks and studying analyses, articles, and numerous weblogs, I was finally convinced that that whole world knows that my participation in the election does not necessarily mean I am legitimatizing the current political system; nor would it legitimize the state's apparatuses that are in charge of organizing the election and counting votes. Finally, I lost patience and hope and decided not to lose my right to vote. The support of respected reformists such as Seyyed Mohammad Khatami for Mr. Rohani also played a role in my decision." (xxxx)

"Finally, I decided to respect the general consensus of Khatami, Tajzadeh, Malekian, Khashayar, Deihimi [influential political activists and public intellectuals], and others. I am happy that the outcome was a unique overall consensus among the moderates and reformists arrived at on one specific topic." (M, 35, Ghazvin)

"After observing Rouhani and Aref in their televised presidential debates talking about the fundamental discontent of the people and also mentioning the previous election's complications and the extremely politicized wave of political action in cities like Kerman, Mashhad, Ahvaz, etc., and finally after the coalition of Rohani and Aref, I was convinced that the chances were high that the coalition of Ghalibaf and Jalili could be defeated." (M, 26, the US, part-time translator)

This final quote leads us to yet another important external condition for Rouhani's victory: the actions of the regime. By referring to for instance political prisoners and the 2009 elections, Rouhani probably presented a much stronger reform platform than the regime had expected beforehand.[20] The Guardian Council could have decided to disapprove Rouhani's candidacy. And why were the votes not stolen like in 2009? We will discuss this bigger political picture in the conclusion.

**Discussion and conclusion**

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[20] See Dina Yazdani:
http://theglobalconsciousness.wordpress.com/2013/06/13/iran-elections-to-boycott-or-not-to-boycott/

The election of Rouhani in June 2013 comprised a significant shift in the Iranian political landscape. It reflected the desire of the majority of the Iranians for a more moderate course in both domestic and foreign policy. Most analysts agree that the large turnout and unified electoral support of the Iranian Green Movement's constituency played a decisive role in Rouhani's sweeping and surprising victory.

The IGM is a loose alliance of pro-democratic groups ranging from those who seek gradual changes to those who want to overthrow the regime. Along these lines, it was divided about whether to participate in unfair elections or not. In fact, at the onset of the 2013 election campaign, a large majority of the IGM adherents intended to boycott the elections in an effort to delegitimize the regime and the presidential contest.

This paper set out to explain why the almost widespread consensus to boycott crumbled so rapidly and unexpectedly. Put differently, its aim was to account for the astonishing opinion shift from boycotting to voting among the adherents of the Green Movement. We focused on social contagion - the notion that individuals ("recipients") adopt the attitudes or behavior from other individuals ("initiators" or "senders") who influence them.

We can summarize our results in four general claims. First, regarding the role of the senders, our empirical findings revealed that voters were much more infectious than boycotters: they were generally much more active in encouraging others to follow their example. Remarkably, persistent boycotters turned out to be even less active than the group of voters who were initially proponents of boycotting the elections or undecided. In other words, even "converted" boycotters put significantly more effort in persuading others to vote, than that persistent boycotters engaged in convincing others to do likewise.

Second, we found that voters were not more strongly socially embedded than boycotters. Rather, what counted is that they were more *active* and more involved in *active* networks. Voting was for instance unrelated with memberships in political organizations and having many online friends, but significantly associated with engaging in political discussions with friends and relatives, being an active member in political groups online, and closely following the news. Indeed, the result has two sides of a coin: because voters were more strongly embedded in active social networks they arguably had a higher propensity to influence (or "infect') others; at the same time, these people had been more receptive to the influence of others themselves in the first place. In many respects, those who did not refrain from boycotting were more isolated and passive than those who eventually decided to vote.

Furthermore, focusing on the susceptibility of "recipients", we conclude that perceived legitimacy and efficacy were significantly related with people's decisions. Individuals who more strongly conceived a moderate and piecemeal, rather than revolutionary, approach to change Iran as more legitimate, were more likely to opt for voting. We likewise found that Green Movement adherents who advocated boycotting instead of electoral participation had more doubts about the efficacy of their individual vote and of elections in general as an effective means to influence Iranian politics.

Fourth, more importantly, people's perceptions of both the efficacy of voting and legitimacy of reformist tactics were significantly shaped over time. Particularly the overall individual and collective efficacy dramatically increased at the end of the campaign. Hereby, we observed comprehensible differences between individuals over time. The reluctant boycotters hardly changed their perceptions, whereas among those boycotters who eventually changed their minds, their initial similar low sense of efficacy had suddenly spiked up.

All these findings combined, we conclude that social influence can indeed explain the

emergence of consensus on voting within a short period of time. The electoral uprising of the Iranian Green Movement in the run-up to the 2013 elections can be ultimately grasped by the significant activeness of the voters at the grassroots level. It can explain why "recipients" tended to shift toward the conviction that voting would be more efficacious than boycotting the elections. Persuasive appeals have a self-reinforcing character: they affected people who were strongly embedded in active networks first, and in turn, they accelerated the exposure to social influence, which was increasingly dominated by the voters. This "cascade" of engaging in voting was all but a cascade of mindless imitation or conformity. Our results suggest that individuals behave in similar ways as others due to social influence as they realize they need to unite their actions in order to be effective, and they indeed increase their hopes when consensus emerges.

Our conclusion is therefore in line with Biggs (2003), who distinguishes *interdependence* and *inspiration* as two separate mechanisms that generate contagion. *Interdependence* entails that a single opposition vote or boycott action makes no sense. People must act in concert in order to exercise any political influence. Hence, they need to consider the actions of others. *Inspiration* means that people's expectations and hopes are raised if they are convinced that they can successfully act collectively.

More generally, this paper build further on a key insight pointed out by Granovetter (1978), namely that due to social influence, a small group of people can trigger a population-wide cascade of participation. The same logic underlies critical mass theory (Marwell & Oliver 1993) and informational cascades (Kuran 1995; Lohmann 1994). We have advanced this logic in three ways.

First, we have highlighted that people are often divided about *which type* of collective action to engage in. Obviously, this is not only true for pro-democracy groups in competitive authoritarian regimes. It has long been noted that social movements are often divided into moderate and radical factions. Despite a shared commitment to common goals, activists frequently differ on what tactics they should adopt to accomplish these goals (Tarrow, *forthcoming*). Second, this paper has acknowledged the distinction between ideational and behavioral diffusion. Real life is often not like Granovetter's threshold model, in which individuals can simply observe how many others already took to the streets, before making their own decision about joining a protest or not. We stressed that *consensus mobilization* is crucial too. Therefore, individuals' beliefs and arguments about what comprise sensible and effective tactics are pivotal. Third, what is largely missing in most classic studies is a detailed discussion of the complement of being activated: *activated people propagating their ideas*. Some people are more influential in converting the opinions of others. Simply put: besides the "susceptibility" of recipients, the "infectiousness" of initiators crucially matters too.

Our results underline that it is too easy to "explain" waves of collective mobilization by simply referring to threshold models, snowball effects or bandwagon effects. Indeed, the terms contagion or diffusion are often just loosely used to describe for instance the spread of riots in the United Kingdom, the escalation of protests during the so-called Arab Spring, and the proliferation of the Occupy movement. In such accounts, the notion of "contagion" frequently resembles an elevator that can only go up, but never down: aggrieved individuals have an intrinsic and latent motivation to join a riot or demonstration, and they will immediately do so when the opportunity arises and a "critical mass" has already started. However, simply being in contact with many adopters does not necessarily generate further diffusion. In making their decisions about joining a certain type of collective action or not, individuals are not simply converted by the dominant opinion of others in their surroundings. People need to get convinced

that certain action is efficacious. At the same time, they need to be willing and able to persuade others.

The relevance of our conclusion extends beyond the particular Iranian case, as it can more generally enhance our understanding of the dynamics of contention when people are faced with opposing tactical choices. Our study aims to encourage scholars of social movements and electoral politics to enlarge their scope on tactical innovation and adaptation of a movement's "repertoire of contention", the set of means that a group has for making claims (Tilly 1986: 4). Faced with elections, widespread political mobilization of democratic opposition sympathizers may manifest itself in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it may be expressed through the channel of non-institutionalized politics, such as boycotts or election-related demonstrations. Boycotts share perhaps more similarities with strikes than with more common forms of protests such as organizing a street demonstration to communicate demands to the government (Beaulieu 2014: 3). On the other hand, the mobilization of citizens can consist of participating in the institutionalized electoral process.

It has been frequently documented that IGM supporters extensively employed the Internet for mobilization after the 2009 presidential elections (Honari, 2013; Yahyanejad, 2010). In the recent years the Internet played an important role in sharing ideas and spreading information and news among Green Movement supporters (Honari, 2013; Baldino & Goold, 2014; Rasouli & Moradi, 2012; Rahimi, 2011), and also in "catching global media attention and raising human rights concerns" (Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010).

The reliance on online social networks supports the role of what Castells (2012: 7) labels "mass self-communication". It means that the content of the messages "is autonomously decided by the sender, the designation of the receiver is self-directed and the retrieval of messages from the networks of communication is self-selected". These communication networks are thus horizontal in structure. In this respect, they enable a more organic and bottom-up means of organization, and undercut the need for leadership. Thus, once again, many-to-many communication channels such as Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube proved to be a widely used network in a wave of collective action – decentralized, viral, almost impossible to interfere with.

This study is not without shortcomings and limitations. First, we have not delved deeply into the issue what the persuasion activities exactly entailed. We have ducked the question what type of arguments were exactly used by people in political discussions, and how often, and what messages people for instance post on Facebook. Hence, a possible avenue for future research is to supplement evidence from questionnaires with content analysis of social media or discussion sites. It could for instance provide more insight why boycotters were less active. Initially, they can be considered as the "silent majority". Our qualitative evidence suggests that they were often silent in public debates about their opinion. If they spoke out, did they encountered more frequently critique than voters when they communicated about politics with others, and therefore became less inclined to express their (intended) choice?

Second, it is hard to tell to what extent our convenience sample accurately represents the Iranian Green Movement supporters. However, we argue that imperfect information is better than none; we are not aware of any comparable panel survey among the Iranian opposition. Due to the online survey, the young and well-educated are probably overrepresented, but obviously we lack any population parameters to compare our sample statistics with. Given the fact that IGM activists have heavily relied on the Internet and online social networks, as we just noted above, it is therefore most likely that we reached the IGM activists through these channels.

The third limitation, also related to our data collection, is that the measurement of our

respondents' attitudes in the third wave, immediately after the elections, is potentially contaminated. One can expect that individuals took the election outcome into account when they filled out the questionnaire. Most notably, contributing to Rouhani getting elected might have significantly propped up people's individual and collective efficacy. Indeed, people would obviously have felt less politically efficacious if the regime would have decided to rig the elections for a fundamentalist hardliner. We likewise found that in June 2013 respondents reported they were less inclined to support revolutionary or violent means to push for political changes.

This brings us to our final discussion point. Although we focused on the dynamics of social influence on the grassroots level, it is not our intention to downplay the role of the political environment in which these processes operate. People sometimes behave in similar ways not because they are influencing one another, but rather because they are exposed to similar external influences. Thus, the tendency of people to behave in similar ways can easily arise in the absence of any social contagion. As Max Weber already noted, if we observe a crowd of people all put up their umbrellas at the same time, we usually do not assume that social influence is responsible.

Two important sets of endogenous factors that could alternatively account for the increased electoral efficacy and corresponding rise in participation come to mind: the actions of the presidential candidates and the IGM's leadership, and the responses of Iranian regime. We do not propose to displace accounts that rely on the political context: after all, if the electoral process would have been truly democratic, the debate whether to vote or boycott would not have existed in the first place. Conversely, the setting would also have been completely different if the regime had not attempted to prevent a crisis of legitimacy, and disqualified both moderate candidates Aref and Rouhani beforehand. It is important to note that the task of explanation is not only to pin down the "final" exogenous causes, but also to unravel endogenous processes (Biggs 2005). Contagion on the grassroots level can explain why, given these circumstances, electoral mobilization could emerge so unexpectedly and boycotting cease so rapidly, on a scale of days and weeks, rather than months and years.

We want to end by stressing again that, with regard to the organizational level (meso-level), the formation of a unified electoral bloc was very important. As Diamond summarized the crucial role of opposition groups: "While an opposition victory is not impossible in a hybrid regime, it requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy" (cited in Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 46). Our paper adds to that insight that not only the leadership, but also many ordinary Iranian should be considered heroic. Due to all those efforts on the ground to accomplish a more democratic society, they also deserve their credits for their contribution to shape the country's destiny.

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## Tables and Figures



**Figure 1.** Electoral participation (actual and intended) in Iran (2009-2013).

*Note:* In February 2013 (W1) and April 2013 (W2) respondents were asked: Will you vote at the next presidential election?
*Source:* Panel Data (inside Iran) (N=157).



**Figure 2.** Cumulative percentage of voters who have decided to participate in the elections (February – June 2013)

*Source:* Panel Data (inside Iran) (N=118).

**Table 1.** Intention in February 2013 (at W1)

| | Vote (N=10) | not vote (N=83) | Undecided (N=64) | Simple Effects: F |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | *df (2, 154)* |
| *Demographics* | | | | |
| Gender | 1.40 (.52) | 1.29 (.46) | 1.33 (.47) | .32 |
| Age | 28.40 (8.30) | 32.78 (7.74) | 31.91 (7.85) | 1.45 |
| Political Interest | 3.30 (.82) | 2.77 (0.90) | 3.13 (.77) | 4.10* |
| Social Class | 2.40 (1.07) | 2.66 (.68) | 2.59 (.75) | .61 |
| Town of Residence | 1.60 (.97) | 1.81 (1.14) | 1.73 (.96) | .21 |
| Political Socialization | 5.00 (1.53) | 5.20 (1.05) | 5.08 (1.15) | .20 |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | | |
| When you get together with … do you discuss politics? | 4.10 (.57) | 3.95 (.79) | 4.00 (.59) | .24 |
| How many people in your circle criticize political situation? | 3.20 (1.03) | 3.70 (.51) | 3.63 (.55) | 3.44* |
| How many people in your circle have been politically active? | 1.90 (0.57) | 1.84 (.69) | 1.86 (.61) | .04 |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.20 (1.55) | 1.17 (1.41) | 1.19 (1.44) | .00 |
| Political Groups Membership | .10 (.32) | .10 (.30) | .17 (.38) | .96 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .70 (.95) | .54 (.74) | .62 (.86) | .30 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .20 (.42) | .39 (.76) | .19 (.43) | 1.91 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.00 (1.15) | 3.12 (0.79) | 3.08 (0.78) | .12 |
| How many people in your circle … are politically active? | 1.90 (.57) | 2.33 (.66) | 2.39 (.70) | 2.28 |
| In how many political groups… are you an active member? | 2.50 (.85) | 2.52 (1.05) | 2.55 (1.01) | .02 |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 2.60 (.97) | 2.59 (1.18) | 2.86 (1.17) | 1.01 |
| *Media source for political news* | | | | |
| Satellite TV | .30 (.48) | .65 (.48) | .67 (.47) | 2.70 |
| Newspapers | .40 (.52) | .18 (.39) | .45 (.50) | 7.00*** |
| Internet News Websites | 1.00 (.00) | .76 (.43) | .84 (.37) | 2.12 |
| Online Social Networks | .50 (.53) | .80 (.41) | .77 (.43) | 2.18 |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.50 (1.27) | 2.12 (.89) | 2.44 (1.10) | 2.08 |
| Identification with IGM | 2.90 (1.52) | 3.37 (1.40) | 3.84 (1.37) | 3.15* |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.70 (1.12) | 2.70 (1.49) | 3.42 (1.36) | 5.69** |
| *Motivations* | | | | |
| Grievances | 1.37 (.49) | 1.29 (.51) | 1.46 (.71) | 1.48 |
| Ideology | 4.10 (.74) | 4.39 (.93) | 4.44 (.69) | .71 |
| *Emotions* | | | | |
| Anger | 3.50 (1.27) | 4.31 (.85) | 3.95 (.92) | 5.28** |
| Hope | 2.20 (1.32) | 1.82 (.87) | 2.34 (1.12) | 5.00** |
| *Efficacy* | | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 3.90 (.74) | 3.75 (1.02) | 3.84 (.89) | .25 |
| Online | 2.90 (.99) | 2.78 (.81) | 2.98 (.86) | 1.03 |
| Election | 2.80 (1.14) | 1.90 (.93) | 3.13 (1.09) | 26.91*** |
| Individual Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 2.90 (.88) | 2.71 (1.05) | 3.00 (.85) | 1.64 |
| Online | 2.30 (1.06) | 2.33 (.93) | 2.58 (.83) | 1.54 |
| Vote | 3.30 (1.06) | 1.35 (.67) | 2.67 (.96) | 59.28*** |
| Tactical Choices | 1.50 (0.69) | 2.29 (1.05) | 1.77 (.82) | 7.17*** |

Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

*Source:* Panel Data (N= 157)

**Table 2.** Intention in April 2013 (at W2)

| | Vote (N=24) | not vote (N=62) | Undecided (N=71) | Simple Effects: $F$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | $df (2, 154)$ |
| *Demographics* | | | | |
| Gender | 1.33 (.48) | 1.31 (.46) | 1.31 (.47) | .03 |
| Age | 28.54 (4.89) | 32.23 (7.53) | 33.30 (8.60) | 3.40 |
| Political Interest | 3.21 (.93) | 2.61 (.96) | 2.97 (.83) | 4.68[*] |
| Social Class | 2.58 (.78) | 2.69 (.80) | 2.57 (.67) | .47 |
| Town of Residence | 1.46 (.78) | 1.92 (1.14) | 1.81 (1.09) | 1.59 |
| Political Socialization | 5.57 (.87) | 5.33 (1.11) | 4.85 (1.25) | 3.86[*] |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | | |
| When you get together with … do you discuss politics? | 4.13 (.90) | 3.74 (.85) | 3.97 (.70) | 2.50 |
| How many people in your circle … criticize …? | 3.58 (.65) | 3.56 (.72) | 3.66 (.53) | .43 |
| How many people in your circle … have been politically active? | 1.88 (.74) | 1.87 (.69) | 1.77 (.74) | .36 |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.46 (1.64) | 1.03 (1.29) | .89 (1.13) | 1.78 |
| Political Groups Membership | .21 (.41) | .05 (.22) | .07 (.26) | 3.11[*] |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .63 (.82) | .45 (.67) | .42 (.73) | .72 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .38 (.65) | .32 (.62) | .20 (.55) | 1.15 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.08 (.83) | 3.15 (.72) | 3.24 (.87) | .42 |
| How many people in your circle … are politically active? | 2.29 (.55) | 2.29 (.78) | 2.22 (.78) | .15 |
| In how many political groups… are you an active member? | 2.83 (.87) | 2.50 (.95) | 2.49 (1.01) | 1.23 |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 2.63 (1.01) | 2.19 (1.07) | 2.48 (1.18) | 1.72 |
| *Media source for political news* | | | | |
| Satellite TV | .54 (.51) | .60 (.49) | .72 (.45) | 1.71 |
| Newspapers | .50 (.51) | .16 (.37) | .25 (.44) | 5.50[**] |
| Internet News Websites | .96 (.20) | .79 (.41) | .87 (.34) | 2.17 |
| Online Social Networks | .75 (.44) | .79 (.41) | .73 (.45) | .30 |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.46 (1.02) | 2.10 (.90) | 2.18 (1.07) | 1.14 |
| Identification with IGM | 3.50 (1.56) | 2.98 (1.42) | 3.75 (1.37) | 4.84[**] |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.79 (1.41) | 2.37 (1.30) | 3.24 (1.37) | 12.01[***] |
| *Motivations* | | | | |
| Grievances | 1.37 (.48) | 1.41 (.73) | 1.37 (.35) | .10 |
| Ideology | 4.21 (.78) | 4.47 (.74) | 4.52 (.65) | 1.78 |
| *Emotions* | | | | |
| Anger | 3.42 (1.28) | 4.42 (.82) | 4.03 (.99) | 9.37[***] |
| Hope | 2.33 (1.13) | 1.58 (.78) | 2.20 (.94) | 9.79[***] |
| *Efficacy* | | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 4.08 (.72) | 3.50 (1.11) | 3.79 (.95) | 3.31[*] |
| Online | 2.96 (.86) | 2.84 (1.09) | 2.80 (.84) | .24 |
| Election | 3.46 (.83) | 1.55 (.69) | 2.80 (.90) | 62.58[***] |
| Individual Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 3.00 (.88) | 2.48 (.94) | 2.90 (.85) | 4.75[**] |
| Online | 2.54 (.78) | 2.26 (.85) | 2.32 (.84) | 1.00 |
| Vote | 3.33 (.87) | 1.24 (.50) | 2.51 (.92) | 78.07[***] |
| Tactical Choices | 1.40 (.71) | 2.44 (1.21) | 1.69 (0.68) | 15.48[***] |

Note: [*] = p < .05, [**] = p < .01, [***] = p < .001

Source: Panel Data (N= 157)

**Table 3.** Actual decision in at elections in June 2013 (at W3)

| | Vote (N=118) | not vote (N=39) | Simple Effects: $F$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | $df (2, 154)$ |
| *Demographics* | | | |
| Gender | 1.35 (.48) | 1.21 (.41) | 2.78 |
| Age | 31.48 (7.62) | 34.15 (8.25) | 3.45 |
| Political Interest | 3.05 (.80) | 2.69 (.95) | 5.31[*] |
| Social Class | 2.57 (.74) | 2.75 (.73) | 1.57 |
| Town of Residence | 1.79 (1.13) | 1.85 (1.06) | .08 |
| Political Socialization | 5.21 (1.20) | 5.04 (1.04) | .40 |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | |
| When you get together with … how often do you discuss politics? | 4.06 (.64) | 3.77 (.58) | 6.22[*] |
| How many people in your circle criticize political situation? | 3.59 (.59) | 3.59 (.68) | .00 |
| How many people in your circle have been politically active? | 2.36 (.77) | 2.13 (.73) | 2.64 |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.56 (1.95) | .97 (1.56) | 2.88 |
| Political Groups Membership | .16 (.37) | .13 (.34) | .24 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .41 (.74) | .28 (.56) | .93 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .50 (.86) | .44 (.82) | .17 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.24 (.77) | 3.08 (.70) | 1.32 |
| How many people in your circle are politically active? | 2.53 (.77) | 2.23 (0.78) | 4.27[*] |
| In how many political groups are you an active member? | 2.67 (.97) | 2.03 (1.04) | 12.47[***] |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 3.11 (1.08) | 2.21 (1.26) | 18.80[***] |
| *Media source for political news* | | | |
| Satellite TV | .60 (.49) | .64 (.49) | .19 |
| Newspapers | .36 (.48) | .10 (.31) | 9.52[**] |
| Internet News Websites | .88 (.32) | .77 (.43) | 2.97 |
| Online Social Networks | .84 (.37) | .67 (.48) | 5.48[*] |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.36 (1.02) | 2.21 (.98) | .66 |
| Identification with IGM | 3.98 (1.15) | 2.51 (1.45) | 41.66[***] |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.78 (1.13) | 2.15 (1.23) | 58.48[***] |
| *Motivations* | | | |
| Grievances | 1.53 (.48) | 1.48 (.72) | .25 |
| Ideology | 4.50 (.74) | 4.54 (.72) | .08 |
| *Emotions* | | | |
| Anger | 3.23 (1.16) | 4.08 (1.04) | 16.54[***] |
| Hope | 3.19 (1.08) | 1.87 (.86) | 47.81[***] |
| *Efficacy* | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 4.08 (.88) | 3.51 (1.05) | 11.18[***] |
| Online | 3.22 (.90) | 2.97 (.93) | 2.16 |
| Election | 3.56 (.86) | 2.08 (.90) | 84.72[***] |
| Individual Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3.29 (.95) | 2.62 ( 1.02) | 14.14[***] |
| Online | 2.86 (.93) | 2.28 (.89) | 11.47[***] |
| Vote | 3.54 (.85) | 1.64 (.74) | 154.57[***] |
| Tactical Choices | 1.50 (0.65) | 2.47 (1.19) | 41.51[***] |

Note: [*] = p < .05, [**] = p < .01, [***] = p < .001

Source: Panel Data (N= 157)

**Table 4.** Overall means of the variables of three waves (February, April, and June 2013)

| | W1 | W2 | W3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | Mean | Mean |
| *Demographics* | | | |
| Gender | 1,31 | | |
| Age | 32,15 | | |
| Political Interest | 2,95 | 2,87 | 2,96 |
| Social Class | 2,62 | | |
| Town of Residence | 1,76 | | |
| Political Socialization | 5,14 | | |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | |
| When you get together with ... how often do you discuss politics? | 3,98 | 3,90 | 3,99 |
| How many people in your circle criticize political situation? | 3,64 | 3,61 | 3,59 |
| How many people in your circle have been politically active? | 1,85 | 1,83 | 2,30 |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1,18 | 1,03 | 1,41 |
| Political Groups Membership | 0,13 | 0,08 | 0,15 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | 0,59 | 0,46 | 0,38 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | 0,29 | 0,27 | 0,48 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3,10 | 3,18 | 3,20 |
| How many people in your circle of friends in online social networks such as Facebook, Googleplus are politically active? | 2,32 | 2,26 | 2,45 |
| In how many political groups, pages, and circles in online social networks are you an active member? | 2,53 | 2,55 | 2,51 |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 2,70 | 2,39 | 2,89 |
| *Media use for political purposes* | | | |
| Satellite TV | 0,64 | 0,64 | 0,61 |
| Newspapers | 0,31 | 0,25 | 0,29 |
| Internet News Websites | 0,81 | 0,85 | 0,85 |
| Online Social Networks | 0,76 | 0,76 | 0,80 |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2,27 | 2,19 | 2,32 |
| Identification with IGM | 3,54 | 3,41 | 3,62 |
| Identification with reformist movement | 3,06 | 2,98 | 3,38 |
| *Motivations* | | | |
| Grievances | 1,36 | 1,38 | 1,52 |
| Ideology | 4,39 | 4,45 | 4,51 |
| *Emotions* | | | |
| Anger | 4,11 | 4,09 | 3,44 |
| Hope | 2,06 | 1,97 | 2,86 |
| *Efficacy* | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3,80 | 3,72 | 3,94 |
| Online | 2,87 | 2,84 | 3,16 |
| Election | 2,46 | 2,41 | 3,19 |
| Individual Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 2,84 | 2,75 | 3,12 |
| Online | 2,43 | 2,33 | 2,71 |
| Vote | 2,01 | 2,13 | 3,07 |
| Tactical Choices | 2,03 | 1,94 | 1,74 |

Source: Panel Data (N= 157)

**Table 5.** Collective (election) efficacy and individual (vote) efficacy of groups in February, April, and June 2013

| | | W1 | | W2 | | W3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd |
| Group Efficacy_ ELECTIONS contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | Group 1 | 2,80 | 1,135 | 3,10 | 1,101 | 3,90 | ,994 |
| | Group 2 | 3,12 | 1,052 | 3,04 | ,892 | 3,68 | ,872 |
| | Group 3 | 2,06 | ,856 | 2,09 | ,976 | 3,39 | ,811 |
| | Group 4 | 1,85 | 1,135 | 1,74 | ,953 | 2,13 | ,833 |
| | Total | 2,48 | 1,166 | 2,44 | 1,098 | 3,22 | 1,063 |
| Individual Efficacy_ your VOTE matters? | Group 1 | 3,30 | 1,059 | 3,00 | 1,054 | 4,40 | ,843 |
| | Group 2 | 2,68 | ,975 | 2,75 | ,931 | 3,56 | ,889 |
| | Group 3 | 1,41 | ,714 | 1,76 | ,950 | 3,35 | ,731 |
| | Group 4 | 1,37 | ,645 | 1,26 | ,535 | 1,63 | ,771 |
| | Total | 2,02 | 1,081 | 2,10 | 1,076 | 3,06 | 1,178 |



**Figure 3.** Differences in collective (election) efficacy over time comparing groups

**Figure 4.** Differences in individual (vote) efficacy over time comparing groups



**Figure 5.** Differences in legitimacy of tactics over time comparing groups

**Persuasion**

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|------|------|------|------|------|
| Mean | 4,40 | 3,92 | 3,54 | 2,13 |

**Figure 6.** Differences in active encouragement of others comparing groups

**Table 6.** Participation in political activities over time comparing groups

| | | W1 | | W2 | | W3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd |
| OfflinePart_Participated in unauthorized street protest, demonstration, march, or rally | Group 1 | 1,50 | 1,269 | 1,00 | 0,000 | 1,80 | 1,317 |
| | Group 2 | 1,28 | ,750 | 1,04 | ,270 | 2,13 | 1,229 |
| | Group 3 | 1,31 | ,836 | 1,16 | ,579 | 2,06 | 1,256 |
| | Group 4 | 1,44 | ,982 | 1,00 | 0,000 | 1,56 | 1,134 |
| | Total | 1,34 | ,866 | 1,07 | ,381 | 1,96 | 1,232 |
| OfflinePart_Participated in authorized street protest, demonstration, march, or rally | Group 1 | 1,50 | ,707 | 1,10 | ,316 | 2,00 | 1,333 |
| | Group 2 | 1,05 | ,225 | 1,00 | 0,000 | 1,93 | 1,399 |
| | Group 3 | 1,22 | ,702 | 1,08 | ,337 | 1,61 | 1,060 |
| | Group 4 | 1,19 | ,738 | 1,00 | 0,000 | 1,09 | ,390 |
| | Total | 1,17 | ,584 | 1,03 | ,216 | 1,64 | 1,158 |
| OfflinePart_Signed a petition or open letter | Group 1 | 2,10 | 1,370 | 1,60 | ,966 | 1,80 | 1,033 |
| | Group 2 | 1,79 | 1,065 | 1,58 | ,917 | 1,74 | ,955 |
| | Group 3 | 1,61 | 1,060 | 1,45 | ,879 | 1,59 | 1,043 |
| | Group 4 | 1,78 | 1,385 | 1,28 | ,581 | 1,19 | ,535 |
| | Total | 1,75 | 1,154 | 1,47 | ,845 | 1,57 | ,936 |
| OfflinePart_Attended a public political meeting/debate/lecture | Group 1 | 1,90 | 1,197 | 2,00 | ,943 | 2,70 | 1,829 |
| | Group 2 | 1,75 | 1,023 | 1,49 | ,836 | 2,31 | 1,286 |
| | Group 3 | 1,55 | ,986 | 1,43 | ,806 | 2,00 | 1,281 |
| | Group 4 | 1,72 | 1,224 | 1,19 | ,535 | 1,34 | 1,035 |
| | Total | 1,69 | 1,063 | 1,44 | ,793 | 2,02 | 1,327 |
| OfflinePart_Attended an informal political meeting/talk/gathering (without any public announcement) | Group 1 | 1,80 | 1,317 | 1,70 | ,949 | 2,50 | 1,650 |
| | Group 2 | 1,75 | 1,169 | 1,58 | 1,117 | 1,94 | 1,265 |
| | Group 3 | 1,63 | 1,113 | 1,45 | ,923 | 1,82 | 1,260 |
| | Group 4 | 1,59 | 1,132 | 1,34 | ,937 | 1,59 | 1,241 |
| | Total | 1,68 | 1,143 | 1,49 | 1,000 | 1,86 | 1,291 |
| OfflinePart_Contacted a politician, government, or local government official | Group 1 | 1,20 | ,422 | 1,20 | ,422 | 1,30 | ,675 |
| | Group 2 | 1,32 | ,848 | 1,33 | ,818 | 1,41 | ,981 |
| | Group 3 | 1,16 | ,543 | 1,22 | ,757 | 1,24 | ,764 |
| | Group 4 | 1,25 | ,622 | 1,03 | ,177 | 1,13 | ,554 |
| | Total | 1,24 | ,682 | 1,22 | ,686 | 1,28 | ,809 |
| OfflinePart_Tried to change somebody's mind about social-political issues by talking face-to-face | Group 1 | 3,10 | 1,595 | 2,50 | 1,650 | 4,10 | 1,287 |
| | Group 2 | 3,39 | 1,292 | 3,00 | 1,333 | 3,93 | 1,096 |
| | Group 3 | 3,29 | 1,270 | 2,80 | 1,281 | 3,75 | 1,262 |
| | Group 4 | 2,88 | 1,661 | 2,34 | 1,428 | 2,69 | 1,447 |
| | Total | 3,23 | 1,391 | 2,76 | 1,368 | 3,61 | 1,332 |
| OfflinePart_Encouraged somebody to attend social-political event or support political activities by talking face-to-face | Group 1 | 3,20 | 1,229 | 2,90 | 1,663 | 4,00 | 1,333 |
| | Group 2 | 2,96 | 1,309 | 2,87 | 1,375 | 4,02 | ,942 |
| | Group 3 | 2,69 | 1,334 | 2,47 | 1,239 | 3,75 | 1,309 |
| | Group 4 | 2,31 | 1,655 | 2,03 | 1,425 | 2,25 | 1,437 |

| | Total | 2,75 | 1,406 | 2,55 | 1,386 | 3,54 | 1,391 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Table 7.** Participation in online political activities over time comparing groups

| | | W1 | | W2 | | W3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd | Mean | Sd |
| OnlinePart_Liked a Facebook page to support a social-political cause | Group 1 | 2,50 | 1,650 | 2,60 | 1,713 | 3,30 | 1,767 |
| | Group 2 | 3,05 | 1,342 | 2,67 | 1,327 | 3,07 | 1,412 |
| | Group 3 | 3,00 | 1,414 | 2,80 | 1,296 | 3,27 | 1,328 |
| | Group 4 | 2,94 | 1,664 | 2,59 | 1,434 | 2,66 | 1,310 |
| | Total | 2,97 | 1,451 | 2,69 | 1,356 | 3,07 | 1,393 |
| OnlinePart_Attended an online political meeting (Paltalk, Skype or Webinar) | Group 1 | 1,70 | 1,252 | 1,40 | ,966 | 2,20 | 1,398 |
| | Group 2 | 1,21 | ,590 | 1,11 | ,363 | 1,35 | ,790 |
| | Group 3 | 1,31 | ,787 | 1,25 | ,595 | 1,37 | ,774 |
| | Group 4 | 1,41 | ,875 | 1,16 | ,448 | 1,59 | 1,188 |
| | Total | 1,32 | ,780 | 1,19 | ,523 | 1,47 | ,946 |
| OnlinePart_Participated in an online campaign by sending a photo or writing a piece | Group 1 | 1,90 | 1,287 | 1,80 | 1,033 | 2,70 | 1,703 |
| | Group 2 | 1,86 | 1,025 | 1,82 | 1,151 | 2,39 | 1,278 |
| | Group 3 | 2,16 | 1,138 | 2,04 | 1,095 | 2,27 | 1,201 |
| | Group 4 | 2,13 | 1,212 | 1,91 | 1,088 | 1,78 | 1,039 |
| | Total | 2,02 | 1,120 | 1,91 | 1,105 | 2,24 | 1,251 |
| OnlinePart_Signed an online petition about political issue | Group 1 | 2,40 | 1,506 | 1,70 | 1,160 | 2,40 | 1,430 |
| | Group 2 | 2,35 | 1,203 | 2,21 | 1,264 | 2,42 | 1,295 |
| | Group 3 | 2,63 | 1,356 | 2,18 | 1,161 | 2,22 | 1,238 |
| | Group 4 | 2,34 | 1,428 | 2,06 | 1,162 | 1,88 | ,976 |
| | Total | 2,45 | 1,319 | 2,13 | 1,197 | 2,23 | 1,228 |
| OnlinePart_Tried to change somebody's mind about social-political issues by using the Internet (chatting or commenting) | Group 1 | 3,30 | 1,703 | 3,10 | 1,524 | 3,90 | 1,663 |
| | Group 2 | 2,74 | 1,142 | 2,65 | 1,232 | 3,42 | 1,388 |
| | Group 3 | 2,82 | 1,292 | 2,49 | 1,206 | 3,43 | 1,253 |
| | Group 4 | 2,56 | 1,318 | 2,31 | 1,148 | 2,53 | 1,344 |
| | Total | 2,77 | 1,271 | 2,55 | 1,229 | 3,27 | 1,398 |
| OnlinePart_Encouraged somebody to attend social-political event or support social-political activities by using the Internet (chatting or commenting) | Group 1 | 2,60 | 1,713 | 2,90 | 1,524 | 3,70 | 1,889 |
| | Group 2 | 2,44 | 1,000 | 2,39 | 1,333 | 3,47 | 1,416 |
| | Group 3 | 2,55 | 1,419 | 2,35 | 1,230 | 3,39 | 1,358 |
| | Group 4 | 2,19 | 1,306 | 1,84 | 1,081 | 2,16 | 1,247 |
| | Total | 2,43 | 1,266 | 2,29 | 1,277 | 3,18 | 1,484 |
| OnlinePart_Shared political posts in online social networks such as Facebook, plus, etc. | Group 1 | 3,00 | 1,700 | 1,20 | ,422 | 3,40 | 2,066 |
| | Group 2 | 3,54 | 1,166 | 1,22 | ,691 | 3,82 | 1,255 |
| | Group 3 | 3,69 | 1,288 | 1,16 | ,674 | 3,73 | 1,343 |
| | Group 4 | 3,38 | 1,454 | 1,03 | ,177 | 2,94 | 1,318 |
| | Total | 3,52 | 1,309 | 1,16 | ,593 | 3,57 | 1,392 |
| OnlinePart_Sent a group e-mail for political purposes | Group 1 | 1,50 | 1,269 | 1,50 | ,972 | 2,00 | 1,333 |
| | Group 2 | 1,82 | 1,071 | 1,68 | 1,020 | 2,09 | 1,286 |
| | Group 3 | 2,33 | 1,532 | 2,33 | 1,519 | 2,39 | 1,498 |

| | Group 4 | 1,94 | 1,413 | 1,66 | 1,035 | 1,69 | 1,061 |
| | Total | 2,00 | 1,341 | 1,89 | 1,245 | 2,10 | 1,335 |

# Appendix A

Variable List

| VarCode | variable Group | Title | Question | Categories |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V1100 | **Demographics** | Gender | What is your gender? | 1 male; 2 female |
| V1200 | | Age | Age | |
| V1300 | | Place of Residence | Where do you live? | 1 inside Iran; 2 outside Iran |
| V1311 | | Town of Residence | What town do you live in? | 1 Tehran; 2 large cities; 3 small cities; 4 Towns and Villages; 5 No Answer |
| V1400 | | Political Interest | How interested are you in politics? | 1 Never; 2 Little; 3 Some; 4 ALot |
| V1700 | | Social Class | People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the...? | 1 Upper Class; 2 Upper Middle Class; 3 Lower Middle Class; 4 Working Class; 5 Lower Class; 6 None |
| | *Off-line Political Participation* | *Off-line Political Participation (Inside Iran)* | *DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS, how often did you participate in any of the following OFFLINE activities?* | *1 Never; 2 Once; 3 A Few Times; 4 Often; 5 Very often* |
| V2100 | | | Participated in unauthorized street protest, demonstration, march, or rally | |
| V2101 | | | Participated in authorized street protest, demonstration, march, or rally | |
| V2104 | | | Signed a petition or open letter | |
| V2105 | | | Attended a public political meeting/debate/lecture | |
| V2107 | | | Attended an informal political meeting/talk/gathering (without any public announcement) | |
| V2114 | | | Contacted a politician, government, or local government official | |
| V2119 | | | Tried to change somebody's mind about social-political issues by talking face-to-face | |
| V2120 | | | Encouraged somebody to attend social-political event or support political activities by talking face-to-face | |
| | *Online Political Participation* | *Online Political Participation (forms)* | *DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS, how often did you participate in any of the following ONLINE activities?* | *1 Never; 2 Once; 3 A Few Times; 4 Often; 5 Very often* |
| V3100 | | | Liked a Facebook page to support a social-political cause | |
| V3102 | | | Attended an online political meeting (Paltalk, Skype or Webinar) | |
| V3104 | | | Participated in an online campaign by sending a photo or writing a piece | |
| V3105 | | | Signed an online petition about political issue | |
| V3109 | | | Tried to change somebody's mind about social-political issues by using the Internet (chatting or commenting) | |
| V3110 | | | Encouraged somebody to attend social-political event or support social-political activities by using the Internet (chatting or commenting) | |
| V3111 | | | Shared political posts in online social networks such as Facebook, plus, etc. | |
| V3112 | | | Sent a group e-mail for political purposes | |
| V5020 | *Electoral Participation* | Past Parliamentary Election (2012) | Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections (2012)? | 1 Yes; 2 No |
| V5030 | | Past Presidential Election (2009) | Did you vote in the last presidential elections (2009)? | 1 Yes; 2 No |
| V5031 | | Candidate Vote (2009) | For which candidate did you vote? | 1 Mahmoud AhmadiNejad; 2 Mehdi Karroubi; 3 Mir-Hossein Mousavi; 4 Mohsen Rezaei |
| V5040 | | Voting Intention (Pres. election 2013) | Will you vote at the next presidential election? | 1 Yes; 2 No; 3 Undecided yet |
| V5100 | | Pres. Elction (2013) | Did you vote in the recent presidential election (2013)? | 1 Yes; 2 No |
| V5140 | | Candidate Vote (2013) | For which candidate did you vote (2013)? | 1 Jalili; 2 Rezaei; 3 Rowhani; 4 Gharazi; 5 Ghalibaf; 6 Velayati; 7 I voted blank or invalid |
| V5150 | | Participants Decision Time | When did you decide to vote? | 1 Before Candidate Registration; 2 Before Guardian Council Announcement; 3 After TV Debates; 4 The Last Week of Electoral Campaigns; 5 One Day Before the Election; 6 Balloting Day; 7 I do not Know |
| V5151 | | Non-participants Decision Time | When did you decide not to vote? | 1 Before Candidate Registration; 2 Before Guardian Council Announcement; 3 After TV Debates; 4 The Last Week of Electoral Campaigns; 5 One Day Before the Election; 6 Balloting Day; 7 I do not Know |
| V5160 | | Voting Reasoning | Why did you particpate in the recent (presidenital) election? | *Open-ended answer* |
| V5161 | | Not Voting Reasoning | Why did not you participate in the recent (presidential) election? | *Open-ended answer* |
| V5170 | | Active Participants | To what extent were you active in encouraging somebodies to participate in the election? | 1 Not at all; 2 Not very much; 3 Somewhat 4 Quite; 5 Very much |
| V5171 | | Active Boycotters | To what extent were you active in encouraging somebodies not to participate in the election? | 1 Not at all; 2 Not very much; 3 Somewhat 4 Quite; 5 Very much; I encouraged others to partcipatie in the election |
| | *Participation Motives* | *Ideology* | *To what extent do you agree with the following statements?* | *1 strongly disagree; 2 disagree; 3 Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4 agree; 5 strongly agree* |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V6101 | | | The situation in Iran is violating my principles and beliefs | |
| V6102 | | | I find the political situation in Iran unfair | |
| V6103 | | | It is important for me to express my political view about the situation in Iran | |
| | *Participation Motives* | *Emotions* | *When thinking about the Iranian social, political and cultural situation, what is your feeling about?* | *1 Not at All; 2 Not Very Much; 3 Somewhat; 4 Quite; 5 Very Much* |
| V6201 | | | Anger | |
| V6202 | | | Desperation | |
| V6203 | | | Frustration | |
| V6204 | | | Worriness | |
| V6205 | | | Happiness | |
| V6206 | | | Hope | |
| V6207 | | | Exiting | |
| V6208 | | | Fearness | |
| | *Participation Motives* | *Grievances* | *How satisfied are you with the following issues in Iran?* | *1 Very Dissatisfied; 2 Dissatisfied; 3 Neutral ;4 Satisfied; 5 Very Satisfied* |
| V6301 | | | Social Situation | |
| V6302 | | | Political Situation | |
| V6303 | | | Economic Situation | |
| V6304 | | | Status of Religion in Society | |
| V6305 | | | Cultural Situation | |
| V6306 | | | International Situation of Iran | |
| | *Participation Motives* | *Efficacy (Instrumentality)* | *To what extent do you think that …* | *1 Not at All; 2 Not Very Much; 3 Somewhat; 4 Quite; 5 Very Much* |
| V6401 | | | OFFLINE activities contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | |
| V6402 | | | ONLINE activities contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | |
| V6403 | | | ELECTIONS contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | |
| V6404 | | | your own participation in OFFLINE activities contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | |
| V6405 | | | your own participation in ONLINE activities contribute to the solution of political problems in Iran? | |
| V6406 | | | your VOTE matters? | |
| V6550 | *Participation Motives* | *Individual Identity* | Some people define themselves as a political, social or human rights etc. activist, others do not. To what extent do you define yourself an activist? | 1 Not at All; 2 Not Very Much; 3 Somewhat; 4 Quite; 5 Very Much |
| V6500 | *Participation Motives* | *Group Identity* | Some people identify with some social movements, others do not, to what extent do you identify with … | 2 Not at All; 2 Not Very Much; 3 Somewhat; 4 Quite; 5 Very Much |
| V6501 | | | the Iranian Green Movement? | |
| V6502 | | | the Iranian democratic movement? | |
| V6503 | | | the reformist movement? | |
| V6504 | | | labor and syndicates movement? | |
| V6505 | | | student movement? | |
| V6506 | | | ethnic minority movement? | |
| V6507 | | | women movement? | |
| V6508 | | | defenders of the Islamic revolution values? | |
| V6509 | | | environmental movement? | |
| V6510 | | | human rights movement? | |
| V6511 | | | defenders of religious values? | |
| V6512 | | | advocates of the supreme leader movement? | |
| V6513 | | | left Movement? | |
| | *Participation Motives* | *Social Embeddedness* | *Have you been involved in any of the following types of organizations IN THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS? If yes, please indicate whether you are a passive member or an active member.* | *1 No; 2 Yes, passive member; 3 Yes, active member* |
| V6601 | | | Mosque or Religious Organizations | |
| V6602 | | | Trade Union or Professional Association | |
| V6603 | | | Political Party | |
| V6604 | | | Women's Organization | |
| V6605 | | | Sport or Cultural Organization | |
| V6606 | | | Environmental Organization | |
| V6607 | | | Community or Neighborhood Association | |
| V6608 | | | Charity or Humanitarian Organizations | |
| V6609 | | | Human or Civil Rights Organization | |
| V6610 | | | Student Organization | |
| V6611 | | | Presidential Electoral Campaign | |
| V6612 | | | City and Village Council electoral Campaign | |
| V6613 | | | Others | |
| V6701 | | Informal Embeddedness 1 | When you get together with your friends, relatives, or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics? | 1 Never; 2 Rarely; 3 Sometimes; 4 Fairly Often; Very Often |
| V6702 | | Informal Embeddedness 2 | How many people in your circle of friends [/colleagues/family] criticize the current political situation in Iran? | 1 None; 2 Some; 3 Many; 4 Almost All |
| V6703 | | Informal Embeddedness 3 | How many people in your circle of friends [/colleagues/families] have been politically active IN THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS? | 1 None; 2 Some; 3 Many; 4 Almost All |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V6704 | | Online Embeddedness 1 | How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 1 None; 2 Some; 3 Many; 4 Almost All; 5 I Do not Know |
| V6705 | | Online Embeddedness 2 | How many people in your circle of friends in online social networks such as Facebook, Googleplus are politically active? | 1 None; 2 Some; 3 Almost All; 4 I am not a Member of any Online Networks |
| V6706 | | Online Embeddedness 3 | In how many political groups, pages, and circles in online social networks are you an active member? | 1 None; 2 Little, 3 Some; 4 A Lot |
| | *Tactical Choices* | *Tactical Choices* | *To improve aforementioned situation of Iran, which tactics do you support for change?* | *1…5* |
| V6901 | | | reformist: revolutionary | |
| V6902 | | | non-violent: violent | |
| V6903 | | | long-term change: short-term change | |
| V7110 | *Communication Channel* | Internet Usage | IN THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS, how much time did you spend using the Internet (on average)? | 1 Less than one hour per week; 2 More than one hour per week; 3 1-2 hours per day; 4 3-4 hours per day; 5 More than 4 hours per day |
| V7120 | *Communication Channel* | Political Internet Usage | IN THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS, how much time did you spend using the Internet for social-political purposes (on average)? | 1 Less than one hour per week; 2 More than one hour per week; 3 1-2 hours per day; 4 3-4 hours per day; 5 More than 4 hours per day |
| V7200 | *Communication Channel* | Political News Sources | Which of the following sources do you use to follow the political news and events? | |
| V7201 | | | | National TV |
| V7202 | | | | National Radios |
| V7203 | | | | Satelite TV |
| V7204 | | | | SW Radios |
| V7205 | | | | Newspapers |
| V7206 | | | | Internet news websites |
| V7207 | | | | Word of mouth from family/friends |
| V7208 | | | | prayers and meetings at the mosque |
| V7209 | | | | Mobile text messages |
| V7210 | | | | Online social networks (like Facebook and Twitter) |
| V7211 | | | | Blogs |
| V7212 | | | | Pamphlet and signs |
| V7213 | | | | e-mails |
| V7214 | | | | Others |
| V7215 | | | | Others-TEXT |
| V7250 | *Communication Channel* | Most Important Political News Sources | Which of the following sources are the most important? | 1 National TV; 2 National Radios; 3 Satelite TV; 4 SW Radios; 5 Newspapers; 6 Internet news websites; 7 Word of mouth from family/friends; 8 prayers and meetings at the mosque; 9 Mobile text messages; 10 Online social networks (like Facebook and Twitter); 11 Blogs; 12 Pamphlet and signs; 13 e-mails; 14 Others |
| V9200 | *Political Socialization* | Period of Political Socialization | In which period you started to be involved in political activities? | 1 the Mosaddegh era and after coup d'état (before 15 khordad 1342); 2 After 15 khordad (1963), before 1979 revolution; 3 60s (war); 4 After War and before reformist movement (Rafsanjani presidency); 5 Khatami presidency (reformist era); 6 First Ahmadinejad Presidency; 7 Second Ahmadinejad Presidency (after emergence of Iran's Green Movement); 8 Not Applicable |

## Appendix B

**Table B1.** Replication of Table 1.

| | Vote (N=49) | not vote (N=394) | Undecided (N=303) | Simple Effects: *F* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | *df (2, 746)* |
| *Demographics* | | | | |
| Gender | 1.22 (.42) | 1.36 (.48) | 1.23 (.42) | 7.31*** |
| Age | 30.40 (6.50) | 32.29 (7.02) | 32.37 (8.28) | 1.49 |
| Political Interest | 3.06 (.94) | 2.71 (0.83) | 2.95 (.81) | 9.01*** |
| Social Class | 2.73 (0.96) | 2.59 (.71) | 2.60 (.65) | .83 |
| Political Socialization | 5.11 (.95) | 5.41 (.98) | 5.24 (1.16) | 2.29 |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | | |
| When you get together with … do you discuss politics? | 3.80 (.87) | 3.90 (.78) | 3.94 (.70) | .78 |
| How many people in your circle criticize political situation? | 2.96 (.91) | 3.58 (.64) | 3.50 (.68) | 18.63*** |
| How many people in your circle have been politically active? | 1.80 (0.57) | 1.79 (.71) | 1.80 (.69) | .015 |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.43 (1.35) | 1.28 (1.72) | 1.17 (1.55) | .76 |
| Political Groups Membership | .10 (.31) | .09 (.28) | .11 (.32) | .52 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .86 (.91) | .57 (.79) | .54 (.75) | 3.52* |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .18 (.44) | .39 (.76) | .29 (.66) | 2.67 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.00 (.90) | 3.14 (.80) | 3.03 (.82) | 1.77 |
| How many people in your circle … are politically active? | 2.22 (.87) | 2.30 (.71) | 2.28 (.71) | .316 |
| In how many political groups… are you an active member? | 2.20 (.94) | 2.48 (.97) | 2.48 (.97) | 1.87 |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 2.39 (1.17) | 2.50 (1.21) | 2.61 (1.21) | 1.09 |
| *Media source for political news* | | | | |
| Satellite TV | .41 (.508) | .72 (.45) | .64 (.48) | 10.55*** |
| Newspapers | .47 (.50) | .22 (.42) | .32 (.47) | 9.09*** |
| Internet News Websites | .90 (.31) | .82 (.39) | .76 (.43) | 2.26 |
| Online Social Networks | .63 (.49) | .80 (.40) | .76 (.43) | 4.16 |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.45 (1.24) | 2.08 (.96) | 2.22 (1.01) | 3.80* |
| Identification with IGM | 2.55 (1.47) | 3.32 (1.42) | 3.67 (1.34) | 15.39*** |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.14 (1.43) | 2.58 (1.35) | 3.29 (1.28) | 25.29*** |
| *Motivations* | | | | |
| Grievances | 1.80 (.87) | 1.27 (.44) | 1.35 (.45) | 26.31*** |
| Ideology | 4.16 (.82) | 4.36 (.85) | 4.35 (.81) | 1.22 |
| *Emotions* | | | | |
| Anger | 3.29 (1.35) | 4.23 (.95) | 4.01 (1.01) | 20.24*** |
| Hope | 2.65 (1.15) | 1.86 (.98) | 2.18 (1.03) | 18.18*** |
| *Efficacy* | | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 3.71 (1.02) | 3.73 (1.07) | 3.74 (1.00) | .21 |
| Online | 2.71 (1.00) | 2.87 (.88) | 2.85 (.86) | .71 |
| Election | 3.14 (1.28) | 1.90 (.92) | 2.86 (1.02) | 98.49*** |
| Individual Efficacy | | | | |
| Offline | 3.02 (1.13) | 2.83 (1.06) | 2.90 (.93) | .99 |
| Online | 2.31 (1.14) | 2.47 (.95) | 2.47 (.86) | .62 |
| Vote | 3.35 (1.27) | 1.48 (.79) | 2.35 (1.00) | 137.39*** |
| Tactical Choices | 1.52 (0.69) | 2.39 (1.11) | 1.84 (.84) | 35.26*** |

Note: $^{*}$= p < .05, $^{**}$= p < .01, $^{***}$= p < .001
Source: W1 (N= 746)

**Table B2.** Replication of Table 3.

| | Actual decision (at W3) | | Simple Effects: $F$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote (N=606) | not vote (N=116) | |
| | | | *df (1, 722)* |
| *Demographics* | | | |
| Gender | 1.37 (.48) | 1.27 (.44) | 4.48[*] |
| Age | 30.82 (7.05) | 33.66 (8.34) | 14.83[***] |
| Political Interest | 3.03 (.83) | 2.80 (.86) | 7.05[**] |
| Social Class | 2.47 (.63) | 2.76 (.81) | 17.38[***] |
| Political Socialization | 5.33 (1.10) | 4.95 (1.39) | .59 |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | |
| When you get together with … do you discuss politics? | 3.97 (.75) | 3.79 (.75) | 5.39[*] |
| How many people in your circle … criticize …? | 3.48 (.69) | 3.48 (.72) | .01 |
| How many people in your circle … have been politically ...? | 2.33 (.72) | 2.10 (.68) | 10.19[***] |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.98 (2.37) | 1.46 (1.90) | 5.06[*] |
| Political Groups Membership | .15 (.36) | .09 (.29) | 2.71 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .55 (.84) | .51 (.76) | .19 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .60 (.97) | .55 (0.90) | .21 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.14 (.75) | 3.02 (.79) | 2.54 |
| How many people in your circle … are politically active? | 2.55 (.73) | 2.41 (0.78) | 3.86[*] |
| In how many political groups… are you an active member? | 2. 76 (.89) | 2.42 (1.05) | 12.95[***] |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 3.20 (1.15) | 2.46 (1.32) | 39.37[***] |
| *Media use for political purposes* | | | |
| Satellite TV | .68 (.47) | .74 (.44) | 1.72 |
| Newspapers | .37 (.48) | .20 (.40) | 13.59[***] |
| Internet News Websites | .90 (.29) | .78 (.42) | 15.92[***] |
| Online Social Networks | .91 (.29) | .83 (.38) | 6.66[**] |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.41 (1.01) | 2.21 (1.08) | 3.91[*] |
| Identification with IGM | 3.86 (1.25) | 2.87 (1.44) | 57.94[***] |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.72 (1.16) | 2.38 (1.21) | 128.00[***] |
| **Motivations** | | | |
| *Grievances* | 1.50 (.53) | 1.39 (.61) | 3.78 |
| *Ideology* | 4.44 (.73) | 4.32 (.85) | 2.70 |
| *Emotions* | | | |
| Anger | 3.45 (1.13) | 4.00 (1.02) | 24.02[***] |
| Hope | 2.93 (1.04) | 1.92 (.89) | 985.02[***] |
| *Efficacy* | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3.93 (.90) | 3.45 (1.07) | 26.63[***] |
| Online | 3.18 (.88) | 3.04 (.96) | 2.41 |
| Election | 3.50 (.87) | 2.21 (.90) | 213.38[***] |
| Individual Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3.24 (.94) | 2.70 ( 1.00) | 31.86[***] |
| Online | 2.84 (.92) | 2.40 (.91) | 22.67[***] |
| Vote | 3.44 (.91) | 1.71 (.78) | 372.62[***] |
| Tactical Choices | 1.50 (0.67) | 2.39 (1.12) | 136.71[***] |

Note: [*] = p < .05, [**] = p < .01, [***] = p < .001
Source: W3 (N= 722)

**Table B3.** Replication of Table 3. (Outside Iran are included)

| | Actual decision (at W3) | | Simple Effects: |
| | Vote (N=802) | not vote (N=188) | *F* |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | *df (2, 990)* |
| *Demographics* | | | |
| Gender | 1.37 (.48) | 1.30 (.46) | 3. 85[*] |
| Age | 31.34 (7.07) | 35.69 (9.81) | 48.97[***] |
| Political Interest | 3.03 (.84) | 2.87 (.88) | 5.43[*] |
| Social Class | 2.57 (.74) | 2.75 (.73) | 1.57 |
| Town of Residence | | | |
| Political Socialization | 5.33 (1.10) | 4.95 (1.39) | 11.32[***] |
| *Informal Embeddedness* | | | |
| When you get together with … do you discuss politics? | 3.98 (.75) | 3.80 (.78) | 9.02[**] |
| How many people in your circle … criticize …? | 3.49 (.68) | 3.45 (.74) | .60 |
| How many people in your circle … have been politically ...? | 2.33 (.73) | 2.15 (.70) | 8.96[**] |
| *Formal Social Embeddedness* | | | |
| Degree of Social Embeddedness | 1.89 (2.34) | 1.70 (2.11) | 1.03 |
| Political Groups Membership | .15 (.36) | .13 (.34) | .39 |
| Apolitical Groups Membership | .53 (.84) | .56 (.83) | .21 |
| Indirectly Political Groups Membership | .61 (.97) | .72 (1.04) | 1.94 |
| *Online Embeddedness* | | | |
| How many of your friends are embedded in online social networks? | 3.16 (.74) | 3.07 (.81) | 1.98 |
| How many people in your circle … are politically active? | 2.57 (.72) | 2.52 (0.80) | .67 |
| In how many political groups… are you an active member? | 2. 76 (.90) | 2.53 (1.04) | 9.25[**] |
| Internet Usage for Political Purposes | 3.24 (1.16) | 2.74 (1.33) | 26.61[***] |
| *Media use for political purposes* | | | |
| Satellite TV | .62 (.49) | .60 (.49) | .41 |
| Newspapers | .35 (.48) | .20 (.40) | 15.74[***] |
| Internet News Websites | .91 (.29) | .81 (.40) | 16.45[***] |
| Online Social Networks | .91 (.29) | .82 (.39) | 11.98[***] |
| *Politicized Identity* | | | |
| Individual Politicized Identity | 2.36 (1.02) | 2.21 (.98) | .14 |
| Identification with IGM | 3.98 (1.15) | 2.51 (1.45) | 26.29[***] |
| Identification with Reformist Movement | 3.78 (1.13) | 2.15 (1.23) | 85.57[***] |
| **Motivations** | | | |
| *Grievances* | 1.51 (.53) | 1.37 (.61) | 9.64[**] |
| *Ideology* | | | |
| *Emotions* | | | |
| Anger | 3.40 (1.14) | 3.91 (1.11) | 31.40[***] |
| Hope | 3.01 (1.03) | 2.03 (.92) | 142.55[***] |
| *Efficacy* | | | |
| Group Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3.96 (.90) | 3.56 (1.10) | 26.93[***] |
| Online | 3.21 (.87) | 3.09 (1.02) | 2.62 |
| Election | 3.57 (.87) | 2.29 (.96) | 314.90[***] |
| Individual Efficacy | | | |
| Offline | 3.21 (.95) | 2.77 ( 1.03) | 31.86[***] |
| Online | 2.84 (.91) | 2.49 (.96) | 21.60[***] |
| Vote | 3.48 (.91) | 1.82 (.97) | 491.17[***] |
| Tactical Choices | 1.50 (0.67) | 2.39 (1.12) | 197.29[***] |

Note: [*] = p < .05, [**] = p < .01, [***] = p < .001

Source: W3 (N= 990)